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1. Introduction: EU Financial Market Governance at an Inflection Point 
An Inflection Point  
The onset of the Global Financial Crisis reached its tenth anniversary in autumn 2018, prompting 
reflections on the turbulent reform period which followed.1  EU financial market governance,2 in 
common with most major systems of financial market governance internationally, experienced 
swingeing reform in the wake of the crisis and a subsequent period of calm might have been 
expected.3 By early 2018, the final pillar measure of the EU’s reform agenda, the behemoth Markets 
in Financial Instruments Directive II/Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFID II/MiFIR) had 
come into force on 3 January 2018, to some fanfare; 4 the new institutions which the crisis had 
brought forth (the three European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the European Systemic Risk 
Board (ESRB) of the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), all established in 2011; and 
Banking Union’s Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), 
which commenced full operations in 2014 and 2016 respectively) were becoming normalized;5 and 
the EU was well launched on a review of the different reforms.6  Also by 2018, EU financial market 
governance, at the heart of which is the massive ‘single rulebook,’ was settling into maturity and 
acquiring the technocratic capacity to respond to environmental conditions, in a more evolutionary 
                                                          
1
 See, eg, the Financial Times’ 2018 retrospective: https://www.ft.com/creditcrisis. 
2
 The term financial market governance is used here to capture the superstructure of rules, supervisory 
arrangements, and institutional structures which govern the EU financial market. 
3
 A massive and wide-ranging literature considers the redrawing of EU financial market governance after the 
Global Financial Crisis. See eg: C Burns, J Clifton, and L Quaglia, ‘Explaining Policy Change in the EU: financial 
reform after the crisis’ (2018) 25 Journal of European Public Policy 728; D Howarth and L Quaglia, ‘Banking 
Union as Holy Grail: rebuilding the single market in financial services, stabilizing Europe’s banks and 
‘completing’ Economic and Monetary Union’ (2013) 51 Journal of Common Market Studies 103; E Ferran, 
‘Crisis-driven Regulatory Reform: where in the world is the EU going?’ in E Ferran, N Moloney, J Hill, and JC 
Coffee, The Regulatory Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (CUP, 2011), 1; and N Moloney, ‘EU Financial 
Market Regulation after the Global Financial Crisis: ‘more Europe’ or more risks?’ (2010) 47 Common Market 
Law Review 1317. 
4
 Directive 2014/65/EU [2014] OJ L173/349 and Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 [2014] OJ L173/84. 
5
 See eg N Moloney, The Age of ESMA. Governing EU Financial Markets (Hart Publishing, 2018);  P Weismann, 
European Agencies and Risk Governance in EU Financial Markets Law (Routledge, 2015); L Cuocolo and V 
Miscia, The Gentle Revolution of European Banking Regulation: models and perspectives in supervision, BAFFI 
Centre Research Paper Series No 2014-164, available via http://ssrn.com/abstract=2539641; and T Tuominen, 
‘The European Banking Union: a shift in the internal market paradigm’ (2017) 54 Common Market Law Review 
1359 and the special edition of the European Business Organisation Law Review on Banking Union ((2015) 
16(3)). 
6
 Commission, Follow-up to the Call for Evidence – EU Regulatory Framework for Financial Services 
(COM(2017)736) (2017).  
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manner than the earlier punctuated, disruptive manner associated with the crisis era.7 Nonetheless, 
three potentially disruptive agents could be identified: the Capital Markets Union (CMU) agenda; the 
ESA Reform Proposal; and the withdrawal of the UK from the EU.   
The CMU agenda was adopted in 20158 and is due for completion by 2019.9 It is designed to 
strengthen market-based funding (or funding through market-based mechanisms, such as securities 
issuances, rather than through bank loan funding); provide new and wider sources of funding; and 
strengthen household access to finance.10 CMU is only the most recent of a series of EU initiatives 
which have, over time, sought to support the development of a single EU capital market. Whether or 
not CMU can deepen capital market funding in the EU financial system - which remains broadly 
bank-based11 - is highly contested.12 Among the many uncertainties are the impact of deep-seated 
political preferences which remains sceptical of market-based funding13 as well as the scale of the 
disruption to the EU capital market which may follow from the withdrawal of the UK.14 But it is clear 
that CMU is bringing with it an extensive reform programme.15 The CMU agenda is primarily 
regulatory, but institutional reform is also on the EU’s financial market agenda. The September 2017 
                                                          
7
 As is discussed further by this author in N Moloney, ‘EU Financial Governance after Brexit: the rise of 
technocracy and the absorption of the UK’s withdrawal’ in K Alexander, C Barnard, E Ferran, and N Moloney, 
Brexit and Financial Services. Law and Policy (Hart Publishing, 2018), 61. 
8
 Commission, Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union (COM(2015)468) (2015). 
9
 Progress is regularly monitored (eg, Commission, Completing the Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to 
accelerate delivery (COM(2018)114) (2018)). 
10
 eg Commission, Mid-Term Review of the Capital Markets Union Action Plan (COM(2017)292) (2017). 
11
 Commission, European Financial Stability and Integration Review 2018 (SWD(2018)165) (2018), 21 and 26-
27. 
12
 CMU has re-ignited longstanding debates on whether EU financial market governance can drive market 
change. See eg  J Gordon and K Judge, The Origins of a Capital Markets in the United States, ECGI Law Working 
Paper No 395/2018, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3154676; N Moloney, ‘Capital Markets 
Union: “ever closer union” for the EU financial system?’ (2016) 41 European Law Review 307; and WG Ringe, 
‘Capital Markets Union for Europe – A Political Message to the UK’ (2015) 9 Law and Financial Markets Review 
5 
13
 See L Quaglia, D Howarth, and M Liebe, ‘The Political Economy of European Capital Markets Union’ (2016) 54 
Journal of Capital Market Studies 185.   
14
 The ECB is sanguine, suggesting that alternative funding sources are likely to emerge (ECB, Financial Stability 
in Europe, May 2017, 28-30) and that financial stability is unlikely to be threatened (ECB, Financial Stability in 
Europe, May 2018, 22-23). 
15
 Its flagship measures are the 2017 Securitization Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 2017/2402 [2017] OJ 
L347/35) and related reforms, directed to promoting securitization and in particular ‘safe, transparent and 
standardized’ (STS) securitizations; and the 2017 Prospectus Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 2017/1129 [2017] 
OJ L168/12), designed to refine the regime which governs issuers’ prospectus disclosures. A host of other 
reforms are in train, including in relation to easier stock market access for small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs); the private placement markets; covered bonds; facilitating the cross-border distribution of investment 
funds; crowdfunding; fintech; and sustainable finance. See P Schammo, ‘Market Building and the Capital 
Markets Union: Addressing Information Barriers in the SME Funding Marker (2017) 14 European Company and 
Financial Law Review 271; and V Bavoso, Capital Markets, Debt Finance and the EU Capital Market: A Law and 
Finance Critique, ECMI Working Paper No 5, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3053783 
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ESA Reform Proposal, which followed the 2017 ESA Review,16 covers all three ESAs but may lead to 
the ESA for financial markets (the European Securities and Markets Authority, ESMA) becoming 
materially more influential on EU financial market governance.17  Among the Proposal’s major 
reforms are that ESMA would be conferred with additional direct supervisory powers over certain 
regulated actors; its funding basis reformed to incorporate an industry component; and the powers 
of ESMA’s decision-making Board of Supervisors - currently dominated by national financial market 
supervisors or national competent authorities (NCAs)  -  diluted by the location in a new ‘Executive 
Board’ (composed of officials appointed by the Parliament and Council) of a series of powers 
currently exercised by the Board of Supervisors and regarded as vulnerable to conflict of interests, 
notably ESMA’s powers to proceed against or impose decisions on NCAs. The ESA Reform Proposal is 
proving highly contested politically and the final form in which the reforms will (if at all, given the 
2019 European Parliament elections) be adopted by the co-legislators can only be guessed.18 But it is 
not unreasonable to predict that ESMA is likely to emerge as a strengthened technocratic actor in EU 
financial market governance.19 Finally, the withdrawal of the UK from the EU may have disruptive 
effects on EU financial market governance. It is unlikely that the UK withdrawal will have major 
implications for EU financial market regulatory governance; the direction of travel as regards 
regulatory reform has recently been set by the more interventionist coalition of ‘market-shaping’ 
Member States and not by the UK; and technocratic actors like ESMA and the ECB can be expected 
to have significant purchase on how the single rulebook develops. 20 The withdrawal of the UK - 
traditionally resistant to institutional centralization -  may, however, accelerate the process of 
institutional reform.21 
The Retail Market Implications 
                                                          
16
 Commission, Consultation on the Operations of the European Supervisory Authorities (2017). 
17
 COM(2017)536.  
18
 At the time of writing, there was evidence of material political contestation, particularly as regards the 
funding and direct supervision reforms, and the Council had not reached political agreement although the 
Austrian Council Presidency (July-December 2018) had included the Proposal among its priority files. See eg F 
Maxwell, ‘Brussels Standoff over Markets Regulator’, Politico, 30 January 2018 and A Carrier, ‘Member States 
to Continue Discussions over Controversial ESAs Review Proposal,’ Norton Rose Fulbright, Financial services: 
regulation tomorrow (24 May 2018). 
19
 See further Moloney, n 5.  
20
 See, from a legal perspective, N Moloney, ‘Bending to Uniformity: EU Financial Regulation With and Without 
the UK’ (2017) 40 Fordham International Law Review (2017) 1335 and, from a political economy perspective, D 
Howarth and L Quaglia, ‘Brexit and the Single European Financial Market’ (2017) 55 Journal of Common 
Market Studies 149.  
21
 See further E Ferran, ‘Regulatory Parity in Post-Brexit UK-EU Financial Regulation: EU Norms, International 
Financial Standards, or a Hybrid Model’ in Alexander et al, n 7, 1;  N Moloney, ‘Brexit and Financial Services: 
(yet) another re-ordering of institutional governance for the EU financial system’ (2018) 55 Common Market 
Law Review 175; and J Armour, ‘Brexit and Financial Services’ (2017) 33 (Supp 1) Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy S54.   
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With all this activity in the EU financial market policy space, why focus on the perhaps less salient 
retail market agenda, which produces little of the political, institutional, and market pyrotechnics 
associated the CMU, ESA reform, and Brexit agendas?  The answer lies in the reality that any 
moment of change or disruption which has the potential to generate new thinking on EU retail 
market governance - or the rules, supervisory arrangements, and institutional structures deployed to 
govern investment by household/consumer investors (here, retail investors)22 in market 
instruments23 - is welcome. Despite repeated cycles of scandal and reform,24 retail market 
governance continues to seek an answer to one of the most intractable questions in modern 
financial governance: how, and to what extent, can households or individual consumers be 
encouraged to save for the long term through market-based instruments25 and, at the same time, be 
protected, to an optimal degree, from abuses and/or from decision-making failures? The difficulties 
are many26 and have been well-rehearsed, nationally,27 regionally,28 and internationally.29 But the 
central policy/governance task is reasonably clear. First, retail investors face multiple forms of 
market failure deriving from the agency costs and risks they are exposed to when investing and 
                                                          
22
 Characterizing the ‘retail investor’ can be challenging given the different traits associated with such 
investors. The spectrum of characterization can range from vulnerable consumer of investment products 
required for welfare needs, to informed financial citizen taking on welfare provision responsibilities from the 
state, to empowered capital supplier to the capital markets. See, eg, D Kingsford Smith and O Dixon, ‘The 
Consumer Interest and the Financial Markets’ in N Moloney, E Ferran, and J Payne (eds), The Oxford Handbook 
of Financial Regulation (OUP, 2015), 695 and N Moloney, ‘The Investor Model Underlying the EU’s Investor 
Protection Regime: consumers or investors’ (2012) 13 European Business Organisation Law Review 169. For 
the purposes of this analysis, the term ‘retail investor’ is used to denote a non-professional investor investing 
discretionary funds in market-based instruments, whether for welfare or accumulation purposes. 
23
 This discussion is concerned with market investments and not with other consumer finance saving products, 
such as pension or insurance products. 
24
 Two of the more recent EU scandals relate to the mis-selling of complex Contracts for Differences (CfDs) 
from Cyprus-based online firms (see ESMA, Statement, European Parliament Committee on Petitions, 17 July 
2017 and ESMA Executive Director Ross, Speech on ‘Regulatory and Supervisory Developments, the challenges 
ahead – a European perspective,’ 20 October 2016); and to the mis-selling of subordinated debt in Slovenian 
banks that were subsequently subject to ‘bail-in’ procedures, leading to serious losses for retail investors (see 
Better Finance, A Major Enforcement Issue: the mis-selling of financial products, Briefing Paper, April 2017). 
25
 Financial markets allow households to smooth consumption over lifetimes, providing the means to 
accumulate and de-cumulate assets (eg, K Dynan, ‘Changing Household Financial Opportunities and Economic 
Security’ (2009) 23 Journal of Economic Perspectives 49).  
26
 On the repeated attempts to grapple with retail market risks in the US see D Langevoort, Selling Hope, 
Selling Risk. Corporations, Wall Street and the Dilemmas of Investor Protection (OUP, 2016) and, from an EU 
perspective, N Moloney, How to Protect Investors. Lessons from the EU and the UK (CUP, 2010). 
27
 On Australia’s post crisis retail market reform efforts see J Hill, ‘Why did Australia Fare so well in the Global 
Financial Crisis’ in Ferran et al, n 3; and on the US response see L Kennedy, P McCoy, and E Bernstein, ‘The 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’ (2012) 97 Cornell Law Review 1141.  
28
 The EU provides the most advanced example of regional coordination as regards retail market protection. 
29
 Most notably through FinCoNet, the recently established (2013) international standard setting body for 
consumer financial market regulators. See http://www.finconet.org. The increased participation of 
consumers/households in financial markets has been identified as shaping transnational financial law: A Riles, 




when relying on financial intermediaries (whether investment advisers, asset managers, brokers, 
investment funds, or other forms of intermediaries). Chief among these are those flowing from 
severe information asymmetries30 and related conflict of interest risks.31  Second, they face the risks 
which flow from the now well-documented behavioural challenges which attend market 
investment.32 These challenges not only disrupt optimal investor decision-making but also, given the 
behavioural features of the supply side, deepen agency costs and risks.33 These different costs and 
risks can lead to significant welfare losses, not least among them sub-optimal market participation 
levels and related impaired ability to save for the long-term through market investments - at a time 
when governments globally are withdrawing from welfare provision.34  
But it is not easy to address these risks and to support retail investors in an optimal manner. 
The task of protecting and encouraging (to whatever extent) retail investors is a notoriously difficult 
one, which is not made easier by the tendency of retail market governance to impose transaction 
costs on capital formation: the ‘sweet spot’ between investor protection and not obstructing capital 
formation is difficult to hit. 35  And yet, the ‘protecting and encouraging’ job should be a relatively 
uncontested and straightforward one. As Donald Langevoort puts it, ‘some public commitment to 
fight marketplaces abuses is necessary to offset fear of exploitation and instil investor confidence.’ 36 
And as John Campbell has argued, enhancing retail investor confidence and willingness to participate 
in the financial markets is an appropriate concern for retail market policy, given the societal welfare 
costs which non- or sub-optimal participation in the markets can generate for households as 
governments withdraw from welfare provision.37  
EU retail market governance, mirroring efforts at national level, has long sought to use 
harmonized regulation as a means of promoting retail investor confidence and of encouraging retail 
market access through protective regulation. But since the 2008 financial crisis, the EU has turbo-
                                                          
30
 S Choi, ‘A Framework for the Regulation of Securities Market Intermediaries’ (2004) 1 Berkeley Business Law 
Journal 45.  
31
 From the extensive financial economics literature on structural conflict of interest risks in intermediation 
see, eg, R Inderst and M Ottaviani, ‘How (not) to pay for advice: A framework for consumer financial 
protection’ (2012) 105 Journal of Financial Economics 393  
32
 On behavioural risks and regulatory design challenges see E Avgouleas, ‘The Global Financial Crisis, 
Behavioural Finance, and Financial Regulation: In Search of a New Orthodoxy’ (2009) 9 Journal of Corporate 
Law Studies 23. 
33
 For an analysis of these two main classes of failures and deficiencies see J Campbell, H Jackson, B Madrian, 
and P Tufano, ‘The Regulation of Consumer Financial Products: An Introductory Essay with Four Case Studies’ 
(2011) 25 Journal of Economic Perspectives 91. 
34
 On the costs non-participation can levy in terms of household welfare see J Campbell, ‘Household Finance’ 
(2006) 61 Journal of Finance 1553. 
35
 Langevoort, n 26, 3 and 131. 
36
 Ibid, 3. 
37
 J Campbell, Restoring Rational Choice: The Challenge of Consumer Protection Regulation, NBER Paper WP 
22025 (2016), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w22025. 
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charged its previously somewhat lack-lustre retail investor protection agenda. In the last ten years or 
so, the regulatory environment has been significantly changed, retail market supervision has come 
on the reform agenda, the relevant institutional governance structures have been re-organized, and 
the animating principles and philosophies underpinning EU retail market governance have shifted. 
2018 marks an important way point, with the pivotal 2014 MiFID II/MiFIR and the 2014 Packaged 
Retail and Insurance-Based Investment Products (PRIIPs) Regulation38  – the two pillars of the new 
retail market regulatory governance regime – coming into force in January 2018. Given the welfare 
implications of intervention in this area and the manifold difficulties, assessment is needed.  
The need for review is more acute given the current inflection point. The CMU agenda is 
primarily concerned with the wholesale (professional) funding markets and regards the retail 
investor for the most part as a capital supplier - and not as a vulnerable consumer of welfare-related 
investments -  as is clear from the Commission’s pathfinder 2015 CMU Green Paper39 which 
regarded the tendency of EU household investors to ‘save’ through deposits rather than to ‘invest’40 
as an obstacle to CMU.41 The Green Paper did, however, identify an effective level of investor 
protection as essential for CMU and acknowledged that stronger retail participation depended on 
trust.42 The Commission’s September 2015 CMU Action Plan had a similar tone: ‘retail investors need 
to save more to meet their retirement needs’, but also noted that ‘better information and advice are 
preconditions if retail investors are to be encouraged [emphasis added] back into market-based 
financing.’43 The subsequent March 2017 Consumer Financial Services Action Plan, which forms part 
of the CMU agenda, was concerned with consumer finance generally and paid only fleeting attention 
to the investment markets,44 but by June 2017, in its CMU Mid Term Review, the Commission was 
calling for households to have ‘more and better opportunities to invest for their future’, warning 
that retail engagement with the capital markets was low, and committing to increasing the 
transparency and comparability of retail investment products.45 Identifying an outflow of household 
funds from capital-market-based investments into deposits and currency, the Commission argued 
that this outflow meant that households were foregoing future consumption and hindering 
                                                          
38
 Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 [2014] OJ L352/1, Articles 15-18. 
39
 Commission, Green Paper. Building a Capital Markets Union (COM(2015)63) (2015). 
40
 See, eg, ECB, The Eurosystem Household Financial and Consumption Survey, Results from the First Wave, 
Statistics Paper Series No 2 (2013) and Commission, 2016 European Financial Integration and Stability Report 
(SWD(2016)146)(2016), 48-49. 
41
 CMU Green Paper, n 39, 19-20.  
42
 Ibid, 5 and 19. 
43
 2015 CMU Action Plan, n 8, 18. 
44
 Commission, Communication on Consumer Financial Services Action Plan: Better Products, More Choice 
(COM (2017) 139). 
45
 CMU Mid-Term Review, n 10, 2 and 6-7. 
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economic growth.46 The Commission’ March 2018 CMU review similarly underlined the need to 
empower households to save for retirement and to inject more savings into capital markets.47  The 
CMU agenda has thus repeatedly identified the two recurring and great challenges of retail market 
governance: how to protect and how to encourage? Whether CMU will have a stabilizing or 
destabilizing effect on the new system of retail market governance which has recently developed at 
EU-level therefore requires consideration. Further, the 2017 ESA Reform Proposal may lead to a 
significantly stronger ESMA. Does this empowering of technocracy within EU financial market 
governance pose risks to the retail market agenda, or might it instead lead to a more secure 
positioning of retail market interests within EU financial market governance? Finally, Brexit should 
not, on the face of it, have material implications for the EU retail financial market; retail markets are, 
as discussed later in this chapter, primarily local in nature. Nonetheless, might Brexit lead to a 
diversion of the EU from its current retail market agenda, with prejudicial effects?  
Roadmap 
This discussion accordingly assesses retail market governance in the EU after a period of significant 
change and at a moment when further change may be on the horizon.   
It first suggests that the recent reform period has led to a material reconfiguration of retail 
market governance in four key ways. First, the animating concerns of EU retail market governance 
have changed. It has traditionally been concerned with the promotion of investor confidence, with 
empowering investors, and with ensuring choice.  While it never went as far as the US in 
‘cheerleading’ for market investments through the regulatory system,48 the EU’s posture towards 
market investment was, certainly until the financial crisis, facilitative.49  It is now significantly more 
paternalistic in nature and distrustful of the investor’s and the market’s ability to support optimal 
choices: EU retail market governance increasingly appears to be directed to constructing ‘safe 
spaces,’  as it were, within which retail investors can operate. Second, it has become highly 
operationalized and concerned with process; the high-level principles which previously characterized 
much of the EU’s regulatory intervention here have been thickened by a procedural approach to 
retail investor protection which drills deep into the business models and processes of retail market 
actors. At the same time, it is also becoming ‘prudentialized’ – to coin a cumbersome term. The 
techniques now familiar from stability-oriented prudential regulation and supervision, notably stress 
                                                          
46
 Commission, CMU Mid Term Review Economic Analysis (SWD(2017)22) (2017), 75. 
47
 N 26, 3. 
48
 As argued in the work of Donald Langevoort in the context of the US Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC). See, eg, D Langevoort, ‘Managing the Expectations Gap in Investor Protection: The SEC and the Post-
Enron Reform Agenda’ (2003) 48 Villanova Law Review 1139. 
49
 See further Moloney, n 22. 
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testing, risk modelling, and scenario planning, are now appearing in EU retail market governance, 
while EU prudential supervision, albeit primarily concerned with financial stability, is beginning to be 
used to achieve conduct-oriented, retail market outcomes. Third, and in a related development, 
retail market governance is becoming an increasingly technocratic concern given the strengthening 
influence of the ESAs and particularly of ESMA on EU retail market governance. Finally, retail market 
governance is becoming ever-more standardized, and the traditional autonomy which Member 
States have enjoyed in this area is decreasing. The chapter goes on to assess whether these 
developments are likely to lead to better outcomes in terms of encouragement and protection, 
before considering whether CMU, the ESA reform process and Brexit will have stabilizing or 
destabilizing effects.  
Section two draws the contours of the post-crisis system of EU retail market governance and 
its main features are identified in section three. Section four examines whether the reforms have 
been productive, and whether further reforms are necessary. Section five considers the implications 
of the current inflection point for EU retail market governance. Section six concludes. 
2. The New EU Retail Market Governance Regime: Coverage and Context 
The retail markets were a latecomer to the massive financial market governance reform programme 
which the EU initiated in response to the 2008-2012 financial and euro area crises. The 
overwhelming political, institutional, and market preoccupation with the restoration of financial 
stability dominated the early stages of this reform period; the prominence of financial-stability-
related reform in the G20 crisis-era reform agenda, which shaped the EU’s response to the financial 
crisis, further embedded financial stability as the core preoccupation of the initial phase of the 
reforms. Later in the reform cycle, however, a retail market agenda emerged.50  
As the crisis-era reform process began to unfold, EU retail market governance was primarily 
regulatory in orientation and covered two of the three main pillars of retail market governance: 
disclosure (primarily through the retail-oriented, short-form ‘summary prospectus’ required under 
the EU’s prospectus regime which governed capital-raising by issuers of securities, and through the 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) I disclosure rules on investment services and 
products;51 and investment distribution (primarily through the MiFID I conduct rules for investment 
intermediation, which covered investment advice, broking, and asset management). It also 
contained a sophisticated fund regulation regime, based on the EU portfolio allocation, risk 
                                                          
50
 For discussion see the articles in the special edition of the European Business Organization Law Review 
13(2)(2012) on ‘Retail Financial Services After the Crisis – Legal and Economic Perspectives.’ 
51
 Markets in Financial Instruments Directive I (MiFID I) 2004/39/EC [2004] OJ L145/1 (since repealed). 
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management, and disclosure rules applied to the ‘UCITS’ fund, the EU’s flagship, retail-oriented 
regulatory vehicle for investment funds.52  
 In the wake of the crisis-era reforms, EU retail market governance has now come to address 
the third major pillar of retail market governance, missing from the pre-crisis period - product 
governance.53  EU retail market governance is also now supported institutionally by the technocratic 
ESAs which are bringing a supervisory dimension to EU retail market governance. Enforcement, a 
critical feature of ex-post retail market governance, remains a largely national competence, albeit 
that the enforcement powers which NCAs must be able to deploy are now harmonized to a 
significantly greater extent. 
Regulatory and Supervisory Reform 
Three major classes of reform can be identified from the recent reform period.   
First, a new product governance regime has been put in place at EU-level.  Since its coming 
into force in 2018, MiFID II/MiFIR requires investment firms to have in place product governance 
processes designed to ensure new and significantly-adapted financial instruments are: subject to an 
approval process, including stress testing; designed to meet the needs, characteristics, and 
objectives of a defined ‘target market,’ the risks to which are identified; and distributed through a 
distribution strategy consistent with the target market.54 These novel firm-facing product 
governance requirements are amplified in detail through administrative rules in Commission 
Delegated Directive 2017/593 which specifies the nature of firms’ product approval and review 
processes.55 The new regime also extends to intervention by regulators. MiFID II/MiFIR confers on 
NCAs and on ESMA (as well as on the European Banking Authority (EBA)) exceptional powers to 
intervene to prohibit the sale of financial instruments, once specific conditions are met; these 
intervention powers are specified in great detail through administrative rules in Commission 
Delegated Regulation 2017/567.56 Similar powers have been conferred on the third ESA, the 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), under the 2014 PRIIPs Regulation. 
These general product-oriented rules and product intervention powers are supplemented by 
targeted product-related regulation of investment funds. Investment fund product regulation is a 
                                                          
52
 Directive 2009/65/EC [2009] OJ L302/32. 
53
 Classically, retail market governance has three components: product governance, directed to precautionary, 
ex-ante intervention relating to how products are designed; distribution, directed to addressing risks, primarily 
conflict of interest risks, arising from the firm/client distribution relationship (marketing, sales, advice, trading, 
eg); and disclosure, directed to informing the retail investor.  
54
 MiFID II, Articles 9(3), 16(3), and 24(2). 
55
 Commission Delegated Directive (EU) 2017/593 [2017] OJ L87/500, Articles 9 and 10. 
56
 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/567 [2017] OJ L87/90, Articles 19-21. 
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very longstanding feature of EU retail market governance: the ‘UCITS’ regulatory fund vehicle is 
subject to immensely detailed EU portfolio allocation/eligible assets rules. But these have now been 
supplemented by the rules governing a new form of fund, the European Long-Term Investment Fund 
(ELTIF), governed by the European Long Term Investment Fund Regulation 2015.57 The ELTIF 
Regulation sets out specific portfolio allocation rules designed to protect retail investors while easing 
their access to the illiquidity premium which the ELTIF provides, as ELTIF investments are locked up 
over the life of the fund; this premium is not available within the UCITS fund structure, which must 
provide for redemption on demand. The ELTIF Regulation also includes product governance rules 
akin to the MiFID II rules: the ELTIF fund manager must assess whether an ELTIF fund is suitable for 
marketing to retail investors, taking into account at least the life of the ELTIF and the intended 
investment strategy of the ELTIF.58 
Second, the EU’s longstanding distribution rules have been reformed. MiFID II/MiFIR, which 
covers a wide range of intermediation services (including investment advice, broking, and asset 
management) in relation to a wide array of financial instruments, builds on and strengthens the 
suite of authorization, conduct, and operational rules which applied to investment intermediaries 
under MiFID I. The MiFID I conduct rules included: an obligation on firms to act in the best interests 
of clients; disclosure requirements; conflict of interest rules; know-your-client/suitability 
requirements; and rules governing execution-only sales, order allocation, and best execution. These 
have been retained and strengthened in the MiFID II/MiFIR regime, but the most significant reforms 
relate to the new rules governing the management of conflicts of interest in the distribution process. 
MiFID II puts in place a new set of rules for ‘independent investment advice,’ which prohibit the 
payment of fees, commissions, and/or other monetary/non-monetary benefits; these rules also 
prescribe that a sufficiently diverse range of instruments must be considered by the firm in providing 
‘independent investment advice,’ and that the range of instruments advised on cannot be limited to 
proprietary or similar financial instruments.59 Further, MiFID II strengthens conflict of interest 
management in non-independent distribution arrangements (typically proprietary distribution 
chains through which firms advise on and sell their own products), by imposing new rules restricting 
when ‘inducements’ can be paid to distributors of investment products: any such payment must be 
designed to enhance the quality of the relevant service and not breach the investment firm’s duty to 
act honestly, fairly, and professionally in accordance with the best interests of the client. MiFID II 
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also imposes new remuneration rules which are designed to prevent client conflict of interests 
within all investment firms.60 These different rules are amplified in detail by administrative rules 
governing the nature of independent investment advice (Commission Delegated Regulation 
2017/56561 and Commission Delegated Directive 2017/593) and when inducements may be 
permitted (Commission Delegated Directive 2017/593).  
Finally, the longstanding EU disclosure regime which applies to investment services and 
financial instruments has been enhanced. This has been primarily achieved through the 2014 PRIIPS 
Regulation which puts in a place a new requirement (which came into force in 2018) for a short-form 
‘key information document’ (KID) for certain ‘packaged’ investment products; the detailed KID 
requirements are set out in the administrative Commission Delegated Regulation 2017/563.62 There 
have also been a number of ancillary refinements to retail market disclosure more generally, 
including in relation to the disclosures provided on services and financial instruments (under MiFID 
II63) and to the short form summary prospectus required under the reformed prospectus regime 
(under the 2017 Prospectus Regulation).  
Institutional Reform 
Institutionally, the major development as regards retail market governance relates to the 2011 
establishment of the three ESAs as part of the ESFS. The ESAs have been conferred with a range of 
quasi rule-making powers (including to advise the Commission on administrative rules, propose 
administrative rules for Commission adoption, and adopt soft law) and supervisory 
convergence/coordinating powers. Each ESA has a ‘consumer protection’ mandate under Article 9 of 
their respective founding Regulations and specific related coordination tasks,64 and ESMA is charged 
with a specific ‘investor protection’ mandate under Article 8 of its founding Regulation. Nonetheless, 
the ESAs are not consumer/retail investor financial protection authorities. They have been conferred 
with an array of powers to support rule-making and supervisory coordination/convergence for the 
single market in financial services generally, and have been primarily concerned, so far, with the 
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wholesale markets. Nonetheless, they have come to exert a distinct technocratic influence on EU 
retail market governance, as discussed in section three.  
Drivers and Context 
The drivers of these different retail market reforms are not easy to unpick, particularly as the 
reforms do not together form a coherent package. The cornerstone 2014 MiFID II/MiFIR reforms 
were initiated by the scheduled review of MiFID I, but the review coincided with and was shaped by 
the crisis-era reform period; the precautionary approach MiFID II/MiFIR adopts to the retail markets, 
evident in the product governance regime and in the new distribution rules, reflects the crisis-era 
concern to contain losses and risks associated with the dominant financial stability agenda. The 2014 
PRIIPS reform, by contrast, was well in train before the crisis-era reform period, was neglected in the 
early stages of the crisis as financial stability took over as the EU’s priority, but benefited from the 
reform momentum associated with the crisis-era period. The 2015 ELTIF Regulation, to take another 
example, is not primarily a retail market governance measure; it forms part of the EU’s wider efforts 
to strengthen the EU’s funding capacity, which assumed importance as the crisis-era receded. It is 
therefore difficult to ascribe a particular political, institutional, or market context to the retail 
market reforms as a package, given their piecemeal nature and their straddling of different periods 
over the 2008-2014 crisis era reform process. It is possible nonetheless to make some observations 
on the forces which shaped the reforms. 
The national political preferences which typically shape EU financial market governance65 
can be discerned in the retail market reforms, but the degree of contestation here has been 
significantly less than that associated with the stability-related elements of the EU’s post-crisis 
financial governance settlement. To the extent political preferences have clashed in the Council in 
this area, this has typically reflected different forms of retail market organization across the EU. The 
MiFID II/MiFIR distribution reforms, for example, were something of a flashpoint in Council 
discussions, reflecting the concern in some Member States, notably France, to protect distribution 
arrangements based on proprietary networks, and to avoid the imposition on these arrangements of 
requirements directed to independent-advice-based channels, which are common only in the UK. 
Political contestation was, however, generally limited, reflecting the political consensus on the need 
to address persistent mis-selling failures and to respond to the socialization by the financial crisis of 
losses across taxpayers. Distinct national traditions and approaches seemed to have acted as a 
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laboratory from which the Member States could draw lessons and not as a source of major 
contestation.66  
Institutional interests, the other dominant influence on EU financial market governance67 have, 
however, left an imprint on the reforms, primarily in the form of the legacy left by inter-institutional 
friction between the Commission and the European Parliament. While both institutions have 
traditionally been supportive of EU-level retail market reform,68 retail market governance became a 
location for material inter-institutional tensions, in relation to retail market administrative rule-
making. In September 2016, the European Parliament, which holds veto powers over delegated rule-
making by the Commission, vetoed, by an overwhelming majority,69 the administrative rules for the 
PRIIPs Regulation KID.70 The PRIIPs veto marked the first time the Commission and Parliament had 
not been able to come to an agreement in relation to a set of administrative rules, and 
notwithstanding the extensive technical preparatory work which had been carried out at ESA level, 
in this case by the three ESAs together. It is not entirely clear why this set of rules triggered this first-
ever veto, although the relatively low salience of retail market regulation may have emboldened the 
Parliament to test its veto powers. The veto was based on the Parliament’s sharp disagreement with 
the Commission on several technical elements of the KID rules, including as regards the different 
investment scenarios disclosed in the KID, and the design of the ‘comprehension alert’ which signals 
when a retail investor may find an investment difficult to understand. But the veto certainly 
underlines the Parliament’s willingness to substitute its own view on retail market regulation design 
for the Commission’s (and the technocratic ESAs’, which support the administrative rule-making 
process).  The veto also reflects the injection of industry interests into Parliament deliberations; it 
was associated with lobbying by the financial industry.71 The PRIIPs inter-institutional imbroglio not 
                                                          
66
 This was particularly the case with the product governance reforms as several Member States had already 
experimented with different approaches to product governance in the early stages of the financial crisis. See 
further N Moloney, ‘The Legacy Effects of the Financial Crisis on Regulatory Design in the EU’ in Ferran et al n 
3, 111. 
67
 See eg R Epstein and M Rhodes, ‘The Political Dynamics behind Europe’s new Banking Union’ (2016) 39 West 
European Politics 415 and N Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation, (OUP, 2014, 3 edition), 
892-893.  
68
 The European Parliament has long been a consistent supporter of retail market reforms. Over 2017-2018, 
eg, its powerful ECON (economic and monetary affairs) committee commissioned a series of reports on mis-
selling in the retail markets (including K Alexander, Marketing, Sale and Distribution. Mis-selling of Financial 
Products (2018) (PE 618.996) and P-H Conac, Subordinated Debt and Self Placement. Mis-selling of Financial 
Products (2018) (PE 618 994)).  
69
 The final vote was 561 votes to 9, with 75 abstentions: European Parliament, Press Release, Parliament 
Demands Better Protection for Small Investors.  
70
 European Parliament, Objection to a Delegated Act: key information documents for packaged retail and 
insurance-based investment products, 14 September 2016 (P8_TA(2016)0347). 
71
 Better Finance, Press Release, 30 August 2016.  
15 
 
only led to the ESAs’ technical expertise as regards retail markets risks being over-ridden;72 it also, 
given the significant delays which the veto and the subsequent redrafting of the administrative rules 
generated, led to a postponement of the implementation of the PRIIPs Regulation and its KID 
protections by one year to 2018.73 
3. The New Retail Market Regime: Paternalism, Proceduralization, Technocracy, and 
Standardization 
Paternalism and Distrust 
EU retail market governance has always been primarily expressed through harmonized protective 
rules: harmonized regulation is the main vehicle for EU retail market intervention. These rules serve 
the driving imperative of EU financial market regulation generally - the removal of barriers to cross-
border trade and the reduction of related transaction costs. But this is a secondary purpose here, 
given the still nascent quality of the cross-border retail market. The harmonization of retail market 
protective rules has long served a different and more transformative purpose: it has sought to build 
investor confidence, through law, in the cross-border investment services market, certainly, but also 
in the investment process generally, and has accordingly sought to encourage as well as to protect.  
While ‘protecting and encouraging’ functions have always been evident in the EU’s retail 
market regulatory regime, the balance between the two has evolved over the time.  Over the first 
great reforming period of EU financial market regulation, the liberalizing 1999-2004 Financial 
Services Action Plan period, retail investor protection rules were harmonized and enhanced across 
the EU, most notably through the new, protective firm-facing conduct regime for investment 
intermediation set out in MiFID I 2004. But investor-facing disclosure requirements, investor choice, 
and investor empowerment were also totems of this period: retail investors were to be empowered, 
through EU regulation, to exercise choice, and the construction of an EU retail investment culture 
became a policy objective. For example, execution-only investment (investment without investment 
advice) was subject to only minimal regulatory requirements under MiFID I, and the proliferation of 
investment funds was promoted through the UCITS fund regime.  Reflecting this facilitative 
orientation, harmonized EU regulation avoided drilling deeply into firms’ business models and 
incentive structures and into industry structure.74  Overall, EU regulatory governance ‘trusted’ the 
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market, as it were. The crisis-era changed this posture to one that is significantly more paternalistic, 
interventionist, and distrustful of the markets.  
Paternalism and the Investment Advice Market 
In the early stages of the crisis-era reform period, it became clear that the EU’s posture was shifting 
towards a more interventionist and distrustful stance. The MiFID II conflict of interest rules, for 
example, intervene directly in the structure of the investment advice industry, imposing restrictions 
on ‘independent’ investment advice and limiting the extent to which commission payments 
(inducements) can be made to investment advisers. More standardized and generic forms of advice 
delivery, better attuned to the needs of retail investors with straightforward investment needs, are 
predicted to develop in the wake of these reforms.75 The MiFID II distribution rules seek to 
proactively shape the investment advice sector in other ways. The MiFID II execution-only regime, 
for example, reduces the space within which execution-only trades (without investment advice) can 
take place: structured UCITS investments and instruments which embed derivatives or incorporate 
structures which make it difficult to understand the risk involved are excluded from execution-only 
trades, while margin lending services relating to execution-only trading (which can lead to losses 
ratcheting) are prohibited.76  
A similarly directive approach to advice and distribution emerges from the ELTIF regime. 
While, on the face of it, the ELTIF leans to a facilitative, empowering form of retail market 
intervention as it eases access by retail investors to riskier long-term investment funds by allowing 
them access to an illiquidity premium, it also seeks to shape the retail investment environment. The 
ELTIF manager, where it sells the ELTIF fund directly, and other distributors of the ELTIF fund, must 
apply a suitability test and, in addition, ensure that, in certain circumstances, a retail investor 
investing in the product not invest more than 10% of the investor’s financial instrument portfolio in 
ELTIFs. 77 
Paternalism and Product Governance  
This change in posture is most apparent in relation to the new product governance rules. The 
legislative MiFID II product governance rules heralded a significantly more precautionary approach 
to the retail markets on their adoption in 2014, but the administrative rules subsequently adopted in 
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2017 underline the extent to which EU retail market regulation has become concerned with shaping 
the environment in which retail investor decisions are made.  
The immensely detailed administrative product governance rules, which apply to 
‘manufacturers’78 of a very wide range of financial instruments, including ‘plain vanilla’ bonds as well 
as complex packaged products, require, for example: that the target market for a financial 
instrument is identified at a ‘sufficiently granular level’ for each financial instrument and must 
specify the type(s) of client for whose needs, characteristics, and objectives the product is 
compatible; that a scenario analysis must be undertaken which assesses the risk of poor outcomes 
and when they may occur, in relation to a series of identified and potentially detrimental events; and 
that the financial instrument be assessed to determine whether it meets the needs, characteristics, 
and objectives of the identified target market, including in relation to its risk/reward profile and the 
business model implications for the firm.79 The target market analysis extends to distribution, with 
manufacturers required to review whether the instrument is being distributed to its target market, 
or instead reaching clients for whose needs, objectives and characteristics it is not compatible.80 
Similar themes emerge, if in a more muted manner, from the 2015 ELTIF regime, which requires the 
ELTIF manager to engage in an internal assessment process, which must include analysis of the life of 
the fund and its intended investment strategy, before deciding it is suitable to market to retail 
investors.81   
Product governance regulation of this form is new to EU retail market regulation and 
operates as a form of ex-ante filtering process. It does not require the pre-screening/authorization 
of investment products by NCAs. Instead, it requires firms to follow a process designed to minimize 
the risk of products which do not meet investor needs being marketed to them -  and also to 
minimize the risks of regulatory devices such as distribution rules (for example, suitability 
requirements) and disclosure requirements (for example, short-form product disclosures) failing 
further down the line. It is a muscular form of intervention which goes beyond protecting retail 
investors from the classic market failures associated with agency/distribution relationships, and 
which seeks instead to shape the investment environment by directing only those products which 
meet the ‘needs, characteristics, and objectives’ of the relevant targeted group to the retail investor. 
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It is concerned with steering the retail investor towards optimal outcomes, and not only with 
reducing the risks of market failure.  
Paternalism and Product Intervention 
The new product intervention regime has a similar hue, albeit it is primarily directed to 
emergency/last resort intervention, although the powers can also apply on a precautionary basis.  
Under MiFIR,82 NCAs must be empowered to prohibit or restrict, in or from the Member 
State, the marketing, distribution or sale of certain financial instruments or structured deposits (or 
such products with certain specified features), or a type of financial activity or practice. These 
powers may be deployed on a precautionary basis by NCAs, before the product has been marketed, 
distributed or sold, where the necessary conditions are met.83 A series of trigger conditions apply, 
which, from the retail investor protection perspective,84 include the threshold requirement that the 
product or activity/practice gives rise to ‘significant investor protection concerns.’85 Immensely 
detailed administrative rules govern the related ‘factors and criteria’ which the NCA must take into 
consideration before deciding ‘significant investor protection concerns’ arise and proceeding to 
prohibit or restrict a product (or activity/practice). The existence of such ‘significant investor 
protection concerns’ can be determined, however, based on only one (or more) of the 
factors/criteria.86 The conferral of these powers, which are new to most Member States,87 provides 
powerful evidence of the EU’s more interventionist approach to the retail markets and its concern to 
shape the investment environment. It also provides an indication of the type of product features 
which the EU regards as potentially troublesome and, by implication, of the type of investment ‘safe 
space’ which may be under construction by the EU. The factors/criteria which can ground a 
restriction/prohibition of a product, and which are indicative of the type of ‘safe space’ sought, 
include the complexity of the product; the size of potential detriment; the type of client engaged, 
including their skill and ability, economic situation, financial objectives, and whether the product has 
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been sold outside its target market; the degree of transparency of the product; the product’s 
components; disparity in the expected risk/return profile; liquidity risks; the degree of innovation; 
and selling practices.88 NCAs are required only to consider whether these factors/criteria are 
relevant to the assessment of ‘significant investor protection concerns’, and to apply them if they 
are. Nonetheless, the factors and criteria amount to a formidable check list of product and 
distribution features which could expose retail investors to risk and are indicative of the type of 
investment space which the EU regards as posing risks.  
Perhaps the most significant indication of the EU’s change of posture and adoption of a 
more distrustful, paternalistic, and interventionist approach comes from the related empowerment 
of the three ESAs, albeit that their product intervention powers are only available where an NCA has 
not taken (adequate) action to address the threat, and only apply on a temporary basis (three-
month renewable) (NCAs may act on a permanent basis). Any empowerment of the ESAs to take 
direct supervisory action raises the prospect of political and institutional contestation, given the 
related leakage of control from either the Member States or the EU institutions. It also raises legal 
difficulties as, under the Meroni doctrine,89 EU agencies cannot take discretionary action unless such 
action is subject to appropriate conditions set by the legislature.90 Nonetheless, EBA and ESMA have 
been empowered under MiFIR with product intervention powers (subject to failure by an NCA to 
act), albeit that more stringent threshold conditions apply than do to NCAs, given the political, 
institutional, and legal complexities.91 The ESAs can be expected to be wary of exercising these new 
powers given their novelty and the political sensitivities. The ESAs’ new powers are not, however, 
‘paper tigers,’ as became clear from ESMA’s 2018 deployment of these powers, shortly after MiFIR 
came into force in January 2018.   
In June 2017 ESMA gave its first indication that it would exercise its new MiFIR powers, in 
relation to the pan-EU outbreak of mis-selling of complex CfDs and similar products during 2015–
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17,92 once MiFIR came into force in January 2018.93 ESMA confirmed its appetite for intervention 
over December 2017 and January 2018, but took a cautious approach, engaging first in a Call for 
Evidence on the proposed intervention.94 The ESMA Board of Supervisors subsequently decided to 
adopt its first ever MiFIR product intervention measures in March 2018. The path-breaking measures 
(which were closely based on the proposals trailed in ESMA’s January 2018 Call for Evidence and 
which were subsequently formally adopted by the Board as regulatory acts (Decisions) of general 
application in May 2018) imposed a series of temporary restrictions on the marketing in the EU of 
CfDs to retail investors, and imposed a temporary prohibition on the marketing of binary options to 
retail investors.95 This intervention by ESMA represents a major staging post in the development of 
EU retail market governance and a vivid illustration of the more paternalistic approach to retail 
market investment which now frames EU retail market governance. 
 
Paternalism and Disclosure 
Similar inferences of a more paternalistic approach can be drawn from the PRIIPs disclosure regime 
–  the most prominent of the crisis-era reforms to retail market disclosure. The new standardized 
KID, now required since 2018 for a wide range of packaged investment products under the PRIIPs 
regime, must, for example, include a comprehension alert for certain more complex products; a 
description of the retail investor to whom the product is intended to be marketed; an indication of 
maximum losses; a summary risk indicator; and four different performance scenarios addressing 
how the product might perform in a stressed, unfavourable, moderate, and favourable scenario.96 
The overall effect can be expected to highlight risks, and may as a result lead to a contraction in the 
distribution of riskier products, particularly as the requirement to highlight risks in an accessible and 
prominent manner might act as a disincentive for firms to develop such products for retail 
distribution. The ELTIF Regulation’s disclosure regime has a similarly interventionist hue. It requires 
that where an ELTIF marketed to retail investors exceeds ten years (or a ten year ‘lock-up’ of the 
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investors’ funds), it must be accompanied by a clear written alert that it may not be suitable for 
retail investors that are unable to sustain such a long-term and illiquid commitment.97 It remains to 
be seen whether this form of disclosure, which adopts a much more assertive approach in risk 
disclosures, will be any more successful than previous models. But certainly, it represents a 
significantly more interventionist and market-distrustful approach.  
Paternalism as a Recurring Theme 
Paternalism can also be traced in the more interventionist, precautionary approach the EU has taken 
to how firms should respond to potential risks and threats to retail investors. For example, the MiFID 
II product governance regime specifies the ‘appropriate action’ which Member States must ensure is 
taken by firms on the occurring of certain ‘crucial events’ that would affect the risk/return profile of 
a financial instrument. These include the provision of information to investors, but also, and more 
intrusively, halting future issuances, changing the financial instrument, and reconsidering 
distribution channels/terminating distribution relationships.98 Similarly, the new regulatory regime is 
more prescriptive and directive in defining when a firm cannot act.  Under the new MiFID II 
independent investment advice regime, for example, firms are prevented from advising clients 
where their business models do not allow the required assessment as to whether they are 
‘independent’ within the terms of MiFID II to be made.99  The space for creative compliance by firms 
is accordingly being narrowed.  
A distrust of financial intermediation and markets and a related more interventionist and 
paternalistic approach can also be traced in how the scope of the regulatory regime has widened. 
The imprints of specific episodes of retail investor detriment are evident on MiFID II, for example, 
underlining the extent to which local mis-selling episodes are now being met by an EU response. One 
of the most striking examples relates to ‘self-placement’ by banks of their securities through their 
proprietary networks, which led to a major mis-selling in scandal in Spain as banks sold complex 
securities to depositors and shareholders in order to shore up their balance sheets over the crisis.100 
The risk to retail investors from self-placement has now been addressed by the inclusion of self-
placement as an in-scope service within MiFID II, as well as by specific MiFID II rules  governing how 
self-placements are to be carried out, including conflict of interest and disclosure requirements.101  
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Overall, the crisis-era reforms introduced by MiFID II, the PRIIPS Regulation, and the ELTIF 
Regulation signal a more distrustful approach to the retail markets and a more muscular and 
paternalistic approach to retail market governance. This approach leans more to protection than to 
encouragement. Nonetheless, by seeking to construct an investment environment which is better 
shaped to the needs of retail investors and more responsive to risks, it may come to build greater 
trust and confidence in the investment process.  
Proceduralization and Prudentialization 
Proceduralization 
This new muscularity is also evident in the proceduralization of EU retail market regulatory 
governance, which is increasingly taking the form of an operating manual for firms.  
The MiFID II product governance rules provide a useful example. The administrative rules 
are closely focused on internal firm processes, the design of which is not left to firm discretion.102 
The main requirement of these rules is that procedures and measures are put in place by firms, but 
the outcomes which these procedures and measures must achieve, and the functions they must 
carry out, are prescribed in great detail. The required conflicts of interest assessment, for example, 
must ensure conflicts of interests are assessed each time a financial instrument is manufactured, 
and the assessment must cover whether clients may be adversely affected by an exposure opposite 
to the one previously held by the firm, or an exposure opposite to the one the firm wants to hold 
after the sale of the product.103 The most striking example of process-related regulation comes from 
the ‘target market’ rules for product manufacturers, which require that the firm identify ‘at a 
sufficiently granular level’ the potential target market for the financial instrument and the type(s) of 
client for whose needs, characteristics, and objectives the financial instrument is compatible; where 
the manufacturer constructs instruments which are distributed  through other firms (and thus has 
only a limited data base on the investors targeted), it must deploy its theoretical knowledge and past 
experience.104 As part of this process, the ‘negative’ target market (those investors for whom the 
product is not compatible) must be identified; the risk/reward profile of the instrument must be 
assessed as being consistent with the target market, as must whether the instrument’s design is 
driven by features that benefit the client, and not by a business model that depends on poor client 
outcomes; and the charging structure must be compatible with the needs and objectives of the 
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target market, and appropriately transparent to that target market.105 Detailed requirements govern 
firms’ ongoing review of financial instruments.106 These include that financial instruments must be 
reviewed on a regular basis to take into account any event that could materially affect the potential 
risk to the target market, and to ensure the instrument remains consistent with its target market 
and is being appropriately distributed to the target market; and that the review process must assess 
whether the instrument has functioned as intended, including by identifying ‘crucial events’ that 
would affect the potential risk/return expectation of the financial instrument.  The detailed process 
requirements on product governance extend to staffing and to how effective board oversight is to 
be secured. Relevant staff involved in the manufacturing of financial instruments are required to 
possess the necessary expertise to understand the characteristics and risks of the financial 
instruments in question,107 while the firm’s internal compliance function must monitor the 
development and periodic review of the firm’s product governance arrangements to detect any risk 
of compliance failures.108 Further, the management body (board) is required to define, approve, and 
oversee product governance arrangements109 and must have effective control over the firm’s 
product governance process, and related compliance reports provided to the board must 
systematically include information on financial instruments manufactured by the firm and their 
distribution strategy.110 These product governance rules have been further thickened and subject to 
proceduralization by ESMA’s 2017 Product Governance Guidelines, which drill deep into the ‘target 
market’ process. The detailed Guidelines, which are supported by practical case studies, are 
designed to standardize procedures and act as a basis for firms’ processes,111 but also to ensure that 
firms do not overly rely on automation but apply qualitative criteria appropriately.112  The MiFID II 
product governance administrative rules and ESMA Guidelines deploy process-related regulation to 
a significantly greater extent than previously in EU retail market regulation. By contrast with MiFID I 
which, by and large, was based on high-level, fiduciary-style conduct principles, the product 
governance rules are directed to an outcome (ensuring that products are designed for and 
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distributed to an appropriate target market) and to the construction of firm processes that support 
that outcome.113  
A similar theme emerges from the distribution sphere. For example, while the characteristics 
of ‘independent investment advice’ are established by high-level requirements under MiFID II, the 
administrative rules on ‘independent investment advice’ specify in detail the process which firms 
must engage in when the selecting the portfolio of financial instruments in relation to which they 
present themselves as providing independent investment advice. The process as prescribed must 
ensure that the number and variety of financial instruments in the portfolio is proportionate to the 
scope of investment advice services offered and adequately representative of financial instruments 
available on the market; consider whether the quantity of financial instruments issued by the firm or 
entities closely linked to it is proportionate to the total amount of instruments considered; and 
include criteria for selecting instruments  that consider all relevant aspects, including risks, costs, and 
complexity, as well as the characteristics of the firm’s clients.114 These rules are also directed to 
business model risks: where such an assessment process is not possible due to the business model of 
the firm or the type of service provided, the firm cannot present itself as ‘independent’. Similarly, 
where independent advice is provided only in relation to certain forms of investments (such as 
‘green’ or ethical investments), the firm must ensure that its service is appropriate for each new 
client on the basis that its business model matches the client’s needs and objectives and the range of 
financial instruments suitable for the client.’115  
The new proceduralization also applies to areas which were already subject to some degree 
of process regulation under MiFID I. The MiFID I suitability/know-your-client requirement, for 
example, had been subject to a degree of process regulation as regards the different client features 
which had to be assessed before a firm could make the suitability assessment of a client which was 
required in certain circumstances by MiFID I (and continues to be required under MiFID II). The 
suitability/know-your-client requirement has now been proceduralized to a much greater extent 
under MiFID II. For example, firms must now take reasonable steps to ensure that information 
collected about clients is reliable, including ensuring that all tools, such as risk assessment profiling 
tools, are fit-for-purpose and appropriately designed; ensuring questions used in the suitability 
process are likely to be understood by clients; and taking steps to ensure the consistency of client 
information. Firms must also have, and be able to demonstrate, adequate policies and procedures to 
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ensure they understand the nature, features, and risks of any services/instruments selected for their 
clients and they can assess whether equivalent services/instruments could meet a client’s needs.116 
Automated process are expressly highlighted and the need for firm judgment emphasised; the 
responsibility to undertake a suitability assessment is specified as resting with the firm and cannot 
be reduced by reliance on electronic systems.117  
Proceduralization is a recurring theme across the MiFID II distribution regime. The new rules 
on underwriting or placing securities, for example, require that systems, controls, and procedures be 
in place to manage conflicts of interests in relation to possible under- or over-pricing, that an 
allocation policy be established, and that the final allocation to each investment client be clearly 
justified and recorded.118 Similarly, remuneration arrangements are now subject to new process 
controls in the form of a requirement to define and implement remuneration policies and practices 
designed to ensure client interests are not impaired by remuneration practices.119 Further, the new 
inducements regime, which specifies when an inducement is permitted (in that it is designed to 
enhance the quality of the services to the client), requires firms to evidence quality enhancement by 
recording how the inducement provides quality enhancement.120  A related new process, based on 
research payment accounts, for unbundling the provision by third parties, such as brokers, of 
investment research to asset managers is now required as part of the MiFID II inducements 
regime.121  
ESMA soft law has brought an additional layer of proceduralization to the MiFID II 
distribution rules. The key ESMA intervention in relation to distribution is its lengthy ‘Q&A’ on MiFID 
II/MiFIR investor protection topics.122 ESMA Q&As do not have the same status as ESMA Guidelines: 
for example, they are not policed through a ‘comply or explain’ mechanism (NCAs must comply with 
Guidelines or explain their non-compliance), and are reactive, being driven by stakekolder questions 
received by ESMA (Guidelines are proactively adopted by ESMA). Nonetheless, as an authoritative 
guide to common supervisory thinking across the EU, ESMA Q&As have the colour of ESMA 
Guidelines and similar potential to shape market behaviour.123 And here again, in the MiFID II/MiFIR 
Investor Protection Q&A, process requirements are being used to achieve outcomes. In relation to 
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securities offering allocations to investors, for example, ESMA’s Q&A covers what the allocation 
record should include and how the allocation justification should be approached, including, for 
example, that ‘particular care’ be taken in recording the allocation decision for those receiving a final 
allocation in the top 20% of the total allocation.124 To take another example, in relation to the MiFID 
II suitability assessment, the Q&A provides case studies for how firms should proceed where a client 
wishes to proceed with an investment which the firm has deemed not to be suitable.125 
Prudentialization 
One of the most striking changes to EU retail market governance concerns the extent to which it has 
begun to embrace the highly interventionist and forward-looking tools associated with financial-
stability-oriented prudential supervision, notably stress-testing and the imposition of capital 
requirements.  
This development has, in an indication of the growing importance of technocracy to EU retail 
market governance, been driven by EBA, which has hitherto not been closely concerned with retail 
market matters given its banking market mandate and its primary focus on prudential matters. EBA 
has, however, come to focus on conduct risk - a risk which is closely tied to retail market risk as it 
incorporates mis-selling risks -  as a threat to financial stability, reflecting an international trend.126 In 
particular, EBA’s Guidelines on the ‘Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process’ (SREP) (which is 
required, under the Capital Requirements Directive IV(CRD IV)/Capital Requirements Regulation 
(CRR), to be undertaken annually by all NCAs of firms within the scope of CRD IV/CRR, primarily 
banks and more complex investment firms) require NCAs to consider a firm’s exposure to conduct 
risk, including in relation to poorly designed distribution channels, conflict of interest in the conduct 
of business, and product mis-selling.127 Indicators of conduct risk include sanctions and complaints 
made against the firm. Capital requirements and other forms of supervisory remediation can follow 
from an SREP assessment of conduct risk; retail market mis-selling, could, accordingly, lead to 
additional, costly capital requirements for a bank.  
In a similar development, in advising the Commission on the relevant administrative rules, 
EBA included conduct (misconduct) risk among the different risks against which banks must place 
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capital for operational risk.128 The management of operational risk is still a novelty for firms and for 
regulators, making EBA’s decision to include conduct risk within operational risk a significant 
indicator of the growing ‘prudentialization’ of conduct risk. Under the new rules on the management 
of operational risks, operational risk events and losses now include those arising from ‘misconduct 
events,’ where wilful or negligent; firms must have in place an ongoing process to identify, assess, 
measure, monitor, and report on operational risks, including misconduct events; and firms must take 
balance sheet provisions against probable operational risk losses, including those arising from 
misconduct events (and allocate related capital).129  
Conduct risk is also beginning to be incorporated within EU bank stress tests. The 2016 
stress test of 51 major EU banks, which was coordinated through EBA, required consideration of the 
impact of conduct risk on bank capital130 and accounted for some €71 billion of related capital 
requirements being imposed on EU banks; the stress test found that conduct risk was the major 
driver of operational risk within EU banks.131 The 2018 stress test will also include conduct risk.132   
Stress-testing-oriented retail market governance can also be found elsewhere. The MiFID II 
product governance regime, for example, requires that a ‘scenario analysis’ must be undertaken by 
firms of financial instruments, and that this assess the risk of poor outcomes and consider a series of 
potentially adverse events, including a market deterioration, the materialization of counterparty risk, 
the instrument failing to be commercially viable or, conversely, demand being higher than expected, 
placing a strain on firm resources.133 The PRIIPS Regulation also incorporates stress testing, requiring 
that the KID contain four scenarios (stressed, unfavourable, moderate, and favourable) which 
explain how the product would perform in each of them.134 
Technocratic Retail Market Governance and ESMA 
The extent to which EU retail market governance has become more paternalistic and distrustful of 
the market is mainly a function of the inter-institutional legislative process and the legislative rules 
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adopted in MiFID II/MiFIR and the PRIIPs regime. The proceduralization and prudentialization of 
these rules, however, can be strongly associated with ESMA, whose technocratic influence on EU 
retail market governance is increasing. ESMA’s powers take two broad forms: quasi-regulatory; and 
supervisory coordination/convergence based. ESMA is not a consumer/retail market agency, 
although it is charged with an objective of ‘enhancing consumer protection’; the task of fostering 
investor protection; and a series of specific consumer/investor protection-oriented 
responsibilities.135 Like the other ESAs, its primary function is to support the single rulebook and 
facilitate supervisory convergence and coordination. Established in 2011, ESMA’s early years saw it 
pre-occupied with the vast array of risk-focused administrative rules and related soft law required to 
amplify and clarify the single rulebook. More recently, however, and as the demands of crisis-era 
rule-making have receded, ESMA has begun to strengthen its capacity in relation to the retail 
markets and to bring a related technocratic quality to EU retail market governance.  
Technocracy and Regulation 
With respect to quasi-rule-making, ESMA has been a decisive influence on the new generation of 
retail market administrative rules. ESMA’s technical advice to the Commission on the MiFID II 
administrative rules on distribution and product governance, for example, was largely followed by 
the Commission.136 ESMA is also thickening the new administrative rulebook by means of a raft of 
soft law, including its 2017 Product Governance Guidelines and its MiFID II/MiFIR Q & A on investor 
protection. 
ESMA’s influence on rule-making now extends beyond the administrative rulebook to 
upstream policy developments, in relation to which it is coming to shape how Commission retail 
market policy develops. It has, for example, brought its technocratic expertize and a retail market 
orientation to bear on the Commission’s fintech strategy,137 including by constructing a data-set on 
national regulatory experiences with crowdfunding and making related recommendations,138 and, 
with the other two ESAs, by assessing the challenges posed by automated financial advice (‘robo-
advice’).139 It similarly sought to shape the early stages of the proposed pan-European Personal 
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Pension Product (PEPP),140 calling for the development process to draw on experience with 
disclosure and distribution tools in the retail investment area.141 ESMA is also seeking to shape 
legislative change upstream on its own initiative where it identifies weaknesses in the legislative 
framework. It has, for example, called for the MiFIR product intervention powers to extend to the 
fund management companies that are currently outside the reach of these powers,142 and identified 
inconsistencies in the cross-sector application of the EU retail market rulebook, including in relation 
to persistent divergences in the treatment of UCITS managers (which sit outside MiFID II).143 
Technocracy and Supervisory Convergence/Supervision 
ESMA’s primary mechanism so far for shaping retail market governance has been its quasi-
regulatory powers. Its supervisory tools, however, are likely to be more influential over time.   
As outlined above in this section three, ESMA has already exercised its MiFIR product 
intervention powers, in a clear signal of some determination to deploy these powers in the retail 
markets when the applicable conditions are met. And notwithstanding their novel and exceptional 
nature, ESMA’s first exercise of its product intervention powers augurs well. ESMA’s justification for 
acting underlines the acuteness and cross-border nature of the risk required before it will take 
product intervention action. For example, ESMA highlighted that very high losses were associated 
with the products which were restricted, reporting that 74–89 per cent of retail investor accounts 
were typically losing money on these investments, and that these highly complex investments had 
become available and were marketed across several jurisdictions – having previously been marketed 
only to niche client sectors – and were raising concerns across a ‘large number of NCAs’.144 ESMA’s 
intervention also suggests a purposeful commitment to taking action to prevent retail detriment 
where deemed necessary, notwithstanding the political and market sensitivities associated with 
these powers.145 Further, the two ESMA Decisions which impose the restrictions on the relevant 
investment products were based on extensive data assessment;146 reflected a concern for 
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proportionality;147 and were signalled well in advance to the industry, which was also given time to 
prepare for the restrictions.148  
 
The product intervention power is, nonetheless, a blunt instrument and is unlikely to be 
frequently deployed given the market, legal, and institutional/political risks. ESMA’s fast-evolving 
supervisory convergence/coordination activities, however, are showing signs of exerting material 
operational influence on how NCAs engage with the practical, day-to-day business of retail market 
supervision. Recent indications suggest that ESMA is beginning to oversee national supervisory 
approaches more closely, particularly by means of its peer review powers.149 The 2016 ESMA peer 
review of NCAs’ supervisory practices in relation to the MiFID I suitability requirements, one of the 
first major ESMA peer reviews in the retail investor protection area, is instructive.  While ESMA 
found, overall, that there were examples of good supervisory practices, it also reported on 
weaknesses and called for stronger supervisory oversight of firm compliance and for a related 
allocation of national supervisory resources; ESMA also highlighted the need for improvements in 
relation to enforcement and communications with stakeholders.150 The tone of the review was 
assertive: ESMA found ‘a lack of a proactive and focused supervisory approach’ in some areas;151 an 
over-focus on the distribution of complex products and insufficient attention to supervision of 
advice in relation to less complex products; a need for NCAs to better adapt their supervisory 
practices according to the complexity of the product in question; that four NCAs had not sufficiently 
supervised the suitability regime over the review period; and, in general, that a greater emphasis 
should be placed on enforcement. The review is also notable for the granular quality of the 
recommendations made by ESMA, including that NCAs review telephone records, review sales 
scripts, and simulate the client experience when assessing the quality of suitability practices; 
consider using thematic reviews and mystery shopping supervisory techniques; communicate more 
frequently with firms, including through ‘Dear CEO’ letters; and make greater use of non-pecuniary 
                                                          
147
 ESMA did not, eg, include warrants and ‘turbo-certificates’ in the CfD restrictions despite their similarities to 
the CfD products which were restricted, although it noted that it would closely monitor such products (March 
2018 Agreed Product Intervention Measures, n 95, 4–5), and placed a complete prohibition on binary options 
only. 
148
 The January 2018 Call for Evidence set out in detail a series of potential restrictions on CfD sales (including 
leverage limits and triggers requiring a firm to close out a retail investor’s position to avoid losses exceeding 
the original investment) and a full prohibition on binary options. These were subsequently agreed by the Board 
in March 2018 and formally adopted in May 2018 but did not apply until July and August 2018, respectively. 
ESMA also produced an explanatory Q&A (ESMA35-36-1262) 
149
 Set out in ESMA Regulation, Article 30. ESMA recently revised its Peer Review Methodology in a manner 
which suggests a commitment to robust and intrusive peer review: ESMA, Peer Review Methodology, July 
2018 (ESMA42-111-4661). 
150
 ESMA, MiFID Suitability Requirements. Peer Review Report (ESMA/2016/584) (2016). 
151
 At 18. 
31 
 
sanctions. ESMA’s peer review powers are still developing and it remains to be seen how NCAs will 
respond to this assertive approach, given that supervision remains a closely-guarded national 
competence and that ESMA’s powers in this area are soft in nature, being limited to 
recommendations and ‘name and shame’ style techniques.152 Nonetheless, this peer review marks 
something of a staging post in the evolution of ESMA’s role in retail market governance. This trend 
has been sustained. ESMA’s subsequent 2017 peer review on NCAs’ supervision of the MiFID I 
requirement that disclosure be ‘fair, clear and not misleading’153 adopted a similarly operational and 
interventionist tone, noting, for example, that the adoption of a ‘risk-based’ approach to supervision 
(which was raised by some NCAs to explain supervisory deficiencies) should be able to accommodate 
action where potential breaches of MiFID I were signalled; warning that supervisory deficiencies in 
one Member State could leak into other national markets; and finding, despite progress being made, 
identified NCAs were still displaying deficiencies 
Peer review aside, the retail markets became a priority for ESMA’s supervisory convergence 
agenda generally in 2017, with ESMA’s 2017 Supervisory Convergence Work Programme highlighting 
retail investor protection and ESMA’s determination to ensure that EU retail investors received the 
same level of protection across the EU, independently of the location of the firm.154 Practical action 
has followed. For example, ESMA pursued a multifaceted supervisory convergence response, 
following the 2015–17 outbreak of aggressive marketing of complex CfDs to retail investors across 
the EU from Cypriot-based firms. While this culminated in ESMA’s adoption of the product 
intervention measures previously discussed, it also included the establishment of an ESMA CfD Task 
Force and a Joint Group of NCAs to facilitate NCA coordination; ESMA’s support of the Cypriot NCA 
in intensifying its supervisory and enforcement activities; and investor warnings and directions to 
the industry.155 Bouts of pan-EU mis-selling have repeatedly bedevilled the EU retail market, but the 
2015–17 CfD saga marked the first time there was an operationalized and coordinated EU-level 
response to a live retail market crisis.  
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ESMA’s intensifying supervisory convergence activities also include its ad hoc interventions 
in response to retail market developments, such as the recommendations it has issued to the 
investment fund industry on ‘closet indexing’ practices (where an asset manager charges a fee for 
active management but is in practice following an index), following stakeholder concern and an 
investigation by ESMA, and its ongoing review of such practices.156 ESMA is also showing an appetite 
for addressing ‘upstream’ potentially problematic market behaviours, as evidenced by its repeated 
warnings on the responsibilities of banks and investment firms when selling complex, higher-risk 
‘bail-in’ securities, at a time when banks were increasing their issuance of these instruments to meet 
the requirements of the EU’s bank recovery and resolution regime.157 Finally,158 ESMA is building a 
significant data-set on EU retail market risks and trends, which has the potential to fill a material gap 
in the EU’s financial market data-set: the retail markets tend to get only sporadic attention in the 
major annual reports on the EU financial market produced by the Commission (primarily the 
‘European Financial Stability and Integration Review’) and the ECB (‘Financial Integration in Europe’). 
The retail markets were not covered to any material extent initially in ESMA’s regular reports on 
‘Trends, Risks and Vulnerabilities’ in the EU market, but this is changing, with recent reports building 
in coverage of retail market trends,159 as well as of charges and pricing practices and their impact on 
investor returns.160 ESMA has also begun to collect data relevant to the retail markets, notably the 
complaints data it collects through a regular survey of NCAs, and which it uses to support its retail 
market activities. Beyond these own-initiative activities, the Commission is increasingly calling on 
ESMA to provide retail market analysis, for example mandating ESMA, in the context of the CMU 
agenda, to provide regular reports on the cost and performance of retail investment products.161 
 
Cross-sector technocratic influence 
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The increasingly technocratic quality of EU retail market governance is predominantly a function of 
ESMA’s activities. But EU retail market regulation, while predominantly based on the MiFID 
II/PRIIPs/UCITS axis, also engages other consumer finance measures (such as the insurance 
distribution rules which apply under the Insurance Distribution Directive and capture the distribution 
of unit-linked (investment-based) insurance products162), given the cross-sector nature of retail 
investment market risks and as investment products can cross the traditional investment, banking, 
and insurance silos into which EU financial regulation is segmented.163 Accordingly, retail market 
issues can leak across from ESMA into the mandates of the other two ESAs, notably in relation to 
deposit-related investments (EBA) and unit-linked (investment-based) insurance products (EIOPA), 
as is reflected in the mandates often given by the co-legislators to the three ESAs to cooperate on 
investment-related initiatives.164  
EBA and EIOPA are following a similar trajectory to ESMA, increasingly engaging with retail 
market risks (where relevant), particularly EBA. While ESMA is the dominant influence on retail 
market administrative rules and soft law, EBA, as outlined previously in this section three, is 
increasingly adopting a retail-market-oriented perspective in its supervisory and stress testing work 
on operational and conduct risk in banks, and is also building a significant data capacity on retail 
market investment.165 In addition, all three ESAs have adopted a series of joint Guidelines in areas 
where the cross-sector synergies are strong, notably in relation to complaints management,166 and 
where a cross-sector response to investment product design and distribution risks is warranted.167   
Standardization  
Standardization and the Single Rulebook 
Finally, standardization is becoming a defining feature of EU retail market governance, as regards 
regulatory but also supervisory governance. 
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Retail market regulation has become highly standardized. EU regulation in this area 
traditionally allowed Member States significant autonomy, reflecting the very limited extent to 
which retail investors operate cross-border as well as the distinct local market features which shape 
retail activity (as noted in section four ahead). This changed over the crisis-era. The interventionist, 
procedural, and technocratic features of the new EU retail market governance regime would have 
inevitably increased the degree of harmonization, but a deliberate, purposeful commitment to a 
more standard approach to retail market intervention can also be identified. While the Commission 
has long favoured more intensive harmonization, across the Member States there was little 
resistance to the detailed mandates given for administrative rule-making across the MiFID 
II/MiFIR/PRIIPs legislative measures, although MiFID II contains express safeguards for Member 
States wishing to ‘gold-plate’ certain rules (or to apply additional rules).168 The European Parliament 
has also been a strong supporter of retail market standardization; its concern that the new PRIIPs 
administrative rules were not sufficiently standardized in relation to the PRIIPs ‘comprehension 
alert’ was among the reasons for its September 2016 veto. At the ESA-level, the commitment to 
standardization is clear. ESMA’s 2017 Product Governance Guidelines, for example, are designed to 
support a common, uniform, and consistent application of MiFID II and to reduce related 
regulatory/supervisory arbitrage risks.169 
By way of example, the administrative rules which amplify the MiFID II distribution regime, 
the MiFID II/PRIIPs disclosure regime, and the MiFID II/MiFIR product governance regime are 
immensely detailed, bringing a new level of granularity to EU retail market regulation. The new 
MiFID II inducements regime, for example, specifies with a significant degree of prescription the 
types of inducement which are permitted, while the related rules governing which ‘minor non-
monetary benefits’ are permitted to be paid to a firm when providing independent investment 
advice are also highly prescriptive.170 Similarly, the MiFID II/MiFIR product intervention regime 
governing when NCAs and the ESAs can intervene to prohibit the marketing of products is highly 
prescriptive, setting out in detail the different factors and criteria which must be assessed before an 
ESA/NCA decision to deploy the intervention power can be made.171 In addition, much of the new 
administrative rulebook for the retail markets is contained in administrative Regulations,172 reducing 
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further Member State discretion; only the product governance rules and those on inducements are 
contained in administrative Directives.  
Standardization and supervision 
While standardization is primarily a function of regulatory governance, there are some indications, 
primarily from ESMA’s peer review and other supervisory convergence activities, of a technocratic 
concern to bring more consistency to NCAs’ supervisory practices in the retail markets. This is most 
marked in the banking sphere, however, where a standardized approach to supervision is mandated 
under the CRD IV/CRR ‘SREP,’ including with respect to bank stress tests. The SREP and bank stress 
tests are directed to securing bank stability. Nonetheless, the way these exercises, which are 
increasingly being standardized by means of EBA action, address conduct/misconduct risk has 
material implications for retail market outcomes as specific and costly supervisory remediations can 
be demanded by NCAs under the SREP and following stress tests.  For example, for the EBA-
coordinated 2018 pan-EU bank stress test, all bank projections given to NCAs on banks’ conduct risks 
were to be supported by all available evidence, banks were to be asked by NCAs to provide evidence 
regarding issues widespread in the industry which could be of relevance, and NCAs were, over the 
stress test, to consider the impact of similar issues in banks’ peer groups.173  
4. Evaluation 
Paternalism and Distrust: Monitoring the Safe Space 
EU retail market governance is accordingly pivoting to a more paternalistic and distrustful posture, 
and seeking to shape the investment environment for retail investors. A ‘safe space’ or ‘regulatory 
sandbox’ might be under construction,174 in which the retail investor can, with a degree of security, 
learn how to save through the markets in a more risk-controlled (but not risk-free) environment.  
But any significant change, such as this, to retail market governance brings risks. These range from, if 
protection is over-weighted, increased industry transaction costs (which may lead to reduced retail 
participation) to, if encouragement is over-weighted, sub-optimal incentivization through the 
regulatory system of retail investors (who may take on risks they are not equipped to manage). 
Tensions between libertarian and paternalistic visions of market operation are acute in the retail 
market area, reflecting the scale of the costs which regulation can impose on capital formation and 
the welfare losses which regulatory failure can generate.  Nonetheless, experimentation and change, 
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in the form of a more distrustful and paternalistic approach to the retail markets at EU level, and the 
construction of a ‘sandbox/safe space’ of sorts, should be given the benefit of the doubt. 
The policy need for effective intervention is pressing. EU households remain reluctant to 
save for the long term through market investments, notwithstanding the potential for accumulation, 
income smoothing, and diversification. While household financial wealth across the EU has increased 
consistently since 2012, this increase has been driven mainly by deposits and by investments in 
insurance and pension products. Equity holdings have increased (marginally) since 2012, but 
holdings in debt securities, investment funds, and financial derivatives/employee share options have 
remained largely flat.175 EU household financial assets are predominantly composed of insurance 
and pension assets (39.7%) and currency and deposits (30%); equity and investment fund assets 
represent 24.8% and debt securities 2.3%.176 Similarly, a recent ‘eurobarometer’ report, based on 
survey evidence, reported that 76% of respondents had a bank account and 44% a savings account, 
but only 9% and 6% respectively owned shares/bonds or investment funds.177 Non-participation 
accordingly represents a major policy challenge: how to shift EU households’ allocation preference 
from deposits, which represent a stable, liquid, and guarantee-backed form of household financial 
allocation, to capital-market-based investments, which may bring higher returns and better support 
long-term welfare needs, but which may also carry greater transaction and information costs and 
risks?  There are a multitude of drivers for households’ portfolio allocations and of non-participation, 
including lack of trust in/access to intermediation structures, levels of discretionary income, poor 
financial literacy, limited access to portfolio diversification opportunities, and the biases which 
obstruct optimal allocation -  and the extent to which these different drivers shape household 
choices is contested.178 Further, not all of these drivers are susceptible to regulation. Nonetheless, it 
not unreasonable to base EU retail market policy in part on the premise that, given the need for 
long-term welfare provision, EU retail market governance should facilitate and support retail 
investor access to the markets, without imposing risks on the retail market which it not able to bear.  
But intervention requires careful regulatory design, as is clear from the persistence in the EU of mis-
selling and of failures to consider retail investor outcomes.179   
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The regulatory tools available, however, are not easy to deploy (disclosure, for example, as 
has been well documented, is of limited use in this area180), and newer tools, notably behavioural 
nudges, are in an early stage of development.181 The regulatory perimeter can be fluid (fintech is 
currently posing particular challenges for retail investor protection, notably in relation to 
crowdfunding) and difficult to fix, involving complex trade-offs between risk and autonomy. Further, 
regulation here must carry significant weight, which it may be unable to bear, as retail investors, 
labouring under severe informational and behavioural constraints are ill-equipped to act as market 
monitors or to bring competitive pressure to bear. Regulators can accordingly be wary of creating 
regulatory incentives for retail participation, particularly in market sectors where they have not 
previously been active, given the risk of poor outcomes and the difficulties in marking out an 
appropriate ‘retail space.’182  
And even where solutions can be found, retail investor interests can be trumped by the still 
dominant financial stability imperative. For example, distinct and competing institutional 
preferences can be identified at present in relation to EU retail investment in complex bank 
securities. The Single Supervisory Mechanism, which supervises Banking Union’s banks and has 
incentives to promote bank resolvability and, where necessary, the imposition of losses on retail 
investor holders of bank securities, appears to regard retail investors as ‘responsible financial 
citizens,’ capable of bearing losses. 183  The ESAs, by contrast, have repeatedly raised the risks which 
bank resolution generates for household investors in bank securities,184 as has the European 
Parliament.185  Similarly, political attention comes and goes but, for the most part, the retail markets 
only acquire salience, and resources are only provided, in the wake of major episodes of mis-selling 
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or scandal which stir the usually diffuse and quiescent retail investor body.186 And this political 
salience can be short-lived as a well-resourced industry responds to reforms – whether by working 
around reforms or calling for deregulation. 
Given the difficulties, new thinking on how the EU protects and encourages retail investors is 
to be welcomed. And some experimentation, in the form of the embrace of a more intrusive form of 
intervention, directed to shaping the retail investment environment, is worth trying. Certainly, the 
evidence of limited participation and persistent mis-selling suggests that the pre-crisis approach to 
retail market governance, which was based on retail investor empowerment, is not a sustainable 
regulatory strategy.187  
But there are dangers here. Experimentation requires review against outcomes, and it also 
requires metrics for assessing outcomes. And the EU regime suffers from a critical weakness in this 
regard. EU retail market governance has developed in a piece-meal manner and has never 
articulated the outcomes sought. Firm behaviour is regulated to ever higher degrees, but the nature 
of the retail market outcomes sought is typically not made express, beyond bromides concerning 
protection and confidence. EU retail market governance clearly now seeks a ‘safer’ investment 
environment, but it is not clear what this looks like. The relevant questions range from the macro 
(including, what level of household participation is optimal? what level of investor detriment is 
within the risk tolerance of the EU/NCAs and how is this monitored? and how can investors’ trust in 
retail market governance be assessed?); to the structural (including, which forms of distribution 
structure are to be privileged, and how is this to be assessed? should retail investors be encouraged 
by product governance, distribution, and disclosure strategies to initially experiment with diversified 
instruments (classically index-funds) or guaranteed bonds, before graduating to riskier investments, 
whether shares or complex investments? and how much risk is ‘enough’?). To take one example, the 
new MiFID II/MiFIR product governance rules, which suggest that a less detailed target market 
assessment can be completed by a product manufacturer for a ‘simple’ UCITS than for a structured 
product, might suggest a nudge towards retail investment in simple UCITS products, but such an 
outcome is implicit, not express.  
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None of these questions are easy to answer. Nonetheless, some form of outcome 
identification, and related metrics for assessing progress, are necessary if the success of the EU’s 
new approach is to be monitored, the new regime calibrated, and any unintended consequences 
avoided or managed.188 Means for assessing financial market intervention are, however, notoriously 
difficult to construct in a way that delivers meaningful results.189 There are some examples available, 
to be sure. The UK Financial Conduct Authority, for example, establishes a series of consumer 
market ‘outcome indicators,’ against which it measures its performance and which allow it to direct 
resources and monitor progress.190 Further, NCAs are adopting increasingly intrusive supervisory 
approaches in their retail markets, and evidence on their experience could inform the outcome 
development process at EU-level.191 But some attempt to establish what success looks like is 
necessary given the novelty of the new regime and the high stakes in terms of household welfare.  
Proceduralization and Prudentialization:  If not ‘What’ – then ‘How To’ 
If the new EU retail market governance regime is ambiguous about the specific outcomes it seeks, it 
is intrusive in dictating to firms how they interact with the retail markets. As outlined in section 
three, EU regulatory governance for the retail markets is increasingly taking the form of an intrusive 
‘how to’ manual, which includes supporting supervisory techniques more familiar from the 
prudential sphere, even if the ‘what’ sought by intervention is not indicated in a granular manner. 
Here again, the new proceduralization and prudentialization of EU retail market governance 
deserves the benefit of the doubt.  
Regulatory governance for financial markets has long recognized that it must grapple with 
the design of internal firm processes and the incentives they create,192 and a related 
proceduralization of regulatory requirements has long been associated with EU financial market 
regulation, particularly as regards risk reduction. But proceduralization is novel in the retail sphere; 
high-level conduct principles previously tended to characterize much of EU retail market regulation. 
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The new EU-level proceduralization of retail market regulation, however, holds the promise of 
reducing the risks to retail investors from internal firm culture and from incentive weaknesses; of 
embedding greater technical capacity within firms in relation to the identification of retail market 
risks and desired outcomes; and of more data-informed action by firms. Procedures are only as good 
as the individuals overseeing and operating them, and of the data on which they depend. But the 
greater prescription of how firms approach their engagement with the retail markets should reduce 
firms’ incentives to mis-sell and lead to a stronger cultural focus on the achievement of good retail 
outcomes.  Proceduralization also implies closer supervisory/NCA engagement with internal firm 
processes. This can be expected to lead to stronger enforcement in the longer-term and in the 
shorter-term implies a much closer relationship between the firm and the supervisor. 
The prudentialization trend also has promise. Requiring firms to use the internal risk 
management tools usually associated with, and familiar from, the banking sphere, such as product 
stress testing, should reduce the risk of mis-selling, but should also have the effect of concentrating 
firms’ attention on how retail market detriment can arise.  The most potential lies with the recent 
deployment of prudential supervisory strategies to address conduct risk, and the inclusion of 
conduct/misconduct risk among the risks against which financial institutions are supervised, stress-
tested, and required to provide capital. This interlinking of prudential supervision and conduct risk 
brings the weight of stability-oriented prudential supervision to bear on retail market risks by 
internalizing within firms, through capital charges, the costs of a poor retail culture, and by 
generating strong, cost-based incentives for firms to focus on retail market outcomes.  
Technocratic Governance: ESMA as a Retail Market Champion 
The injection of technocracy also augurs well for a strengthening of EU retail market governance, 
particularly as regards regulatory governance. ESMA has now built a significant technical capacity in 
relation to retail market rule-making; in gathering and interrogating empirical evidence on the retail 
markets; and in ‘horizon-scanning’ for emerging retail risks, notably in relation to financial 
innovation. It is well-equipped accordingly to identify weaknesses in, the unintended consequences 
of, and required remediations to the new EU retail market regulatory regime. Hitherto, although the 
Commission had begun to make some headway, particularly in relation to behavioural and empirical 
research,193 evidence-based regulatory design and finessing has been a weak point in EU retail 
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market governance. The ECB, the EU powerhouse in relation to data collection and interrogation, 
has shown little interest in the retail markets, while the European Systemic Risk Board, charged with 
monitoring the EU market for risks, does not have a retail mandate and focuses only sporadically on 
retail issues and then with an eye to systemic risk implications.194 ESMA looks well-equipped, 
however, to strengthen the EU’s empirical and related regulatory design capacity as regards the 
retail markets.  
ESMA is also strengthening the retail market agenda within EU financial market policy 
generally. It has already proved to be robust in protecting retail interests during the development of 
administrative rules.195 ESMA is also proving wary of the empowering and capital-supply agendas 
which can be associated with the CMU project, highlighting the importance of balancing 
encouragement with protection; ESMA Chairman Maijoor has warned that the strong preference of 
European households for deposit-based savings will not be shifted unless households gain or regain 
confidence in the capital markets, and that an enhancement of investor protection is crucial if 
households are to feel comfortable with the risk/reward balance offered by capital markets.196 
There are, however, limits to ESMA’s ability to strengthen EU retail market governance. 
ESMA does not have a mandate across all forms of substitutable investment product, the treatment 
of which can vary depending on the regulatory ‘silo’ in which the product sits. Most notably, 
insurance-related investment products come within the purview of EIOPA, and the related EU 
insurance distribution rules which apply diverge from, and are lighter than, the MiFID II distribution 
rules. Even within the securities/financial market ‘silo’ within which ESMA sits, there are persistent 
divergences in treatment across the EU retail rulebook, including in relation to cost disclosures 
under the MiFID II, PRIIPs, and UCITS framework.197 And while the three ESAs, through their Joint 
Committee, seek to adopt convergence measures which are consistent across their different sectoral 
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silos, different legislative rules can combine to make it impossible for a common approach to be 
taken.198  
There also dangers from the ever-increasing influence of ESMA, particularly as regards its 
supervisory coordination/convergence activities. A degree of supervisory convergence and 
consistency is necessary to promote best practices and to avoid arbitrage risks in the EU retail 
market. But safety valves against the EU regime acting as an obstructive clamp are also necessary. 
Retail markets display considerable structural difference across the EU, with retail investor 
preferences and distribution structures often differing sharply, as noted ahead in this section. The 
Commission, in its 2017 ESA Consultation, similarly acknowledged that consumer financial 
protection (generally) was a shared competence between the EU and its Member States,199 while the 
NCAs which are coordinated through ESMA are typically concerned to protect their autonomy and 
flexibility as regards retail market intervention. There are, however, encouraging signs. ESMA’s 
refined Peer Review Methodology, adopted in July 2018, highlights the importance of 
accommodating different supervisory approaches which respond to local market features,200 while 
ESMA also appears sensitive to NCAs’ concerns to retain autonomy. 201 
Whatever the merits of ESMA action, questions arise as to the appropriateness of 
legitimation. ESMA’s increasing reach over regulatory governance, its growing influence on 
supervisory practices, and its direct product intervention powers demand that its legitimation 
arrangements are secure. Thus far, ESMA is working within a relatively secure legitimation 
framework that includes the constitutive rules that structure its discretion - under the ESMA 
Regulation but also under relevant EU legislation, such as the detailed MiFIR rules governing its 
product intervention powers -  as well as its multiple accountability-oriented legitimating 
mechanisms, including those provided by its NCA-dominated Board of Supervisors, administrative 
and judicial review, its budgetary oversight arrangements, and institutional accountability to the 
Council and European Parliament.202 But if ESMA’s powers increase, close attention will be needed 
to its legitimation arrangements. This all the more the case as, while the European Court of Justice 
has shown some appetite for allowing national courts significant room to manoeuvre as regards 
their judicial review of technocratic decisions made by national regulatory authorities under EU 
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regulatory measures,203 there are some indications that it is less inclined to inquire into ESMA’s 
financial market decision-making,204 implying that other forms of legitimation must be robust.  
Standardizing Retail Market Governance: Risks to Flexibility  
Standardization could also prove problematic as there is still little evidence of a real ‘EU retail 
market’. Households in the EU rarely, if ever, invest in cross-border investment products, and 
distribution channels vary across national markets and are usually contained within national 
markets.205 A 2016 Commission ‘eurobarometer’ on financial products and services, based on survey 
evidence, similarly found that none of its respondents had purchased shares or an investment cross-
border.206 Retail investment is a local process and reflects domestic idiosyncrasies.  
The main impact of EU retail market governance is accordingly on domestic markets, but 
these markets diverge, often sharply.  There is significant variation in the size of household financial 
asset portfolios across the EU (as a proportion of GDP).207 Investment patterns vary widely, reflecting 
the cocktail of factors, including local distribution structures, path-dependent product preferences, 
taxation and welfare systems, and cultural biases which shape investment across the EU.  In relation 
to equity holdings, for example, the largest proportional holdings by households are in Estonia, 
Bulgaria, and Lithuania; but when it comes to investment funds, the largest household holdings are 
in Luxembourg, Belgium, and Spain.208 There is also significant heterogeneity on the supply side. 
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the Framework Directive.   
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Industry cost structures, competitive conditions, distribution arrangements, and taxation burdens 
vary across the EU, shaping how firms interact with retail investors.209  
The increasing standardization of retail market governance across the EU by EU measures 
could accordingly hinder NCAs’ ability to secure good retail market outcomes geared to national 
market features, to manage local risks, and to use regulatory and supervisory incentives to respond 
to local drivers of household portfolio allocation. It could also stifle experimentation and innovation, 
and so limit the potential of national systems to act as laboratories in which potential EU-level 
solutions can be developed and tested; the MiFID II distribution and product governance reforms, 
for example, were informed by earlier reforms trialled in the UK and the Netherlands.  
Nonetheless, it is difficult to argue against the current levels of regulatory standardization. It 
is a functional reality, for a start, and there is little political or institutional contestation of the 
current drive to standardize rules. Further, EU-level retail market regulation brings economies of 
scale, allows the sharing of regulatory experience, and brings the EU’s growing empirical capacity to 
bear on retail market regulation. The standardization trend is also being tempered by the 
proportionality mechanisms increasingly being used to calibrate EU rules to particular market 
situations. For example, the MiFID II mandate for administrative conduct rules required that the 
nature of different services, products, and clients be taken into account in the development of the 
regime,210 and a concern for proportionality can be traced in the related administrative rulebook; 
the product governance rules, for example, are to apply in a way which takes into account the 
nature of the instrument, service, and target market concerned.211 Proportionality is also a feature of 
EMSA’s related soft law, including of  ESMA’s 2017 Product Governance Guidelines. While there was 
some market concern that the ‘target market’ assessment for ‘plain vanilla’ bonds might require as 
granular an assessment as more complex products,212 the Guidelines make clear that the intensity of 
a firm’s target market assessment should be calibrated to the features of the particular product. 213 
Supervisory standardization poses greater risks. Supervisory jurisdiction over the retail 
markets currently rests at national level with NCAs, albeit that supervision is coordinated through 
ESMA by means of its different supervisory convergence activities. The need for greater convergence 
in NCAs’ supervisory practices is incontrovertible given the risks to the nascent cross-border retail 
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market from supervisory failures, but also given the risks to domestic retail investors from poor 
national supervisory practices and, more positively, given the benefits of supervisory learning and 
experience sharing in an area which is challenging for supervisors.214 Creeping convergence could, 
however, come to place excessive pressure on national discretion. Nonetheless, there are few signs, 
so far, that ESMA is encroaching into national supervisory autonomy to prejudicial effect. Its 2018 
product intervention action, for example, appears to have enjoyed strong NCA support, while its 
peer reviews, although robust, are not designed to impose particular supervisory approaches.215 
5.   The Impact of the Inflection Point 
There are, therefore, grounds for optimism, but the implications of the inflection point outlined at 
the outset of this discussion fall to be considered.  
The CMU Agenda 
Chief among the forces that may bear on the EU’s new retail market governance regime is the CMU 
agenda. At first sight, the CMU agenda jars with the new EU retail market governance regime and its 
privileging of protection. CMU can be associated with assertive support for stronger retail investor 
engagement with market-based savings and it characterizes the retail investor as a capital supplier. 
But there was little in the Commission’s pathfinder 2015 CMU Green Paper that suggested a policy 
sensitivity to the dangers posed by attempts to ‘cheerlead’ for market investments; to the serious 
behavioural challenges faced by retail investors; and to the entrenched structural market features 
that can lead to poor retail investor outcomes. As far as reforms went, cursory reference was made 
in the Green Paper to the benefits of financial literacy, to the value of standardized products, and to 
potential enhancements to the powers of the ESAs.216 The response from the traditional supporters 
of retail investors in the EU was, not unexpectedly, cool.217 The subsequent September 2015 CMU 
Action Plan maintained the commitment to ‘fostering’ retail investment.218 It placed considerable 
weight on the ability of market mechanisms to encourage retail investment and on the competence 
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of empowered investors. Similarly, it suggested that restoring the trust of retail investors was 
primarily the responsibility of the finance industry, although regulation and supervisors could ‘help 
to establish the rules of the game.’219  The related CMU ‘actions’ adopted by the Commission were 
to increase choice and competition for retail investors, to help them get a better deal, and to 
support saving for retirement. The CMU Action Plan’s related reform agenda for the retail markets 
was, however, more articulated than that presented earlier by the CMU Green Paper. In addition to 
committing the Commission to the adoption of a specific Green Paper on Retail Financial Services 
(this was adopted in 2015  and was followed by the March 2017 Consumer Financial Service Action 
Plan220) and to examining the case for a European Personal Pension Product (the PEPP), its main 
component was empirical. The Commission committed to undertaking three major reviews: a review 
into the performance of long-term retail and pension products; a review of the new disclosure 
landscape; and a comprehensive assessment of the market for retail investment products, including 
distribution channels and investment advice, to identify ways to improve the policy framework so 
that retail investors could access ‘suitable’ products on cost-effective and fair terms, and to address 
fintech.221 By the Commission’s subsequent June 2017 Mid-Term Review of the CMU agenda, 
enthusiasm for the retail investor as capital supplier seemed to have waned. The Commission made 
the usual reference to the limited engagement by EU retail investors with capital markets, despite 
their being among the highest savers in the world, and to the value of market investments in 
addressing the challenges posed by ageing populations and low interest rates.222 But although the 
Commission argued that access to attractive investment propositions on competitive and 
transparent terms was necessary, the related actions were limited to progress on the PEPP initiative 
and a gearing up of the different retail market reviews promised. By the March 2018 review of 
progress on the CMU agenda,  while the Commission noted that CMU should provide savers with 
‘more and innovative investment opportunities’, the Commission’s main focus was on accelerating 
progress on the main wholesale market measures, although it did prioritise its  FinTech Action 
Plan223 which, it argued, would enable innovation but not compromise investor protection.224 
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Accordingly, while the CMU policy rhetoric suggests something of a pivot away from the 
currently distrustful posture of EU retail market governance, in practice there are few real 
indications of a destabilizing policy shift from current EU retail market governance arrangements.  
The CMU agenda is certainly leading to a host of reforms, which may ultimately increase choice for 
retail investors, but these are primarily concerned with the wholesale markets. 225 Most of the retail-
oriented reforms are either concerned with consumer finance generally (of which the keystone 
measure is the 2017 PEPP Proposal226); fintech specifically, but with a retail market dimension (the 
2018 Crowdfunding Proposal227); or retail market data collection (for example, the ESAs have been 
charged with reporting on the cost and past performance of the main categories of retail 
investment, insurance, and pension products, while a major study was completed for the 
Commission in 2018 on retail investment distribution systems228).  Of these initiatives, the 2018 
Crowdfunding Proposal has the most immediate relevance for retail market investment, but it is 
somewhat peripheral. The proposed new regime for regulating crowdfunding is designed to operate 
as a voluntary ‘opt in’ measure for crowdfunding platforms seeking access to an ‘EU’ label and to EU-
level authorisation (by ESMA), is not designed to replace national regimes, is at a very early stage of 
its legislative passage, and its future beyond the 2019 European Parliament elections may be 
uncertain.  But whatever its fate, the Proposal has a protective quality which has resonances with 
the current design of EU retail market governance, using mechanisms beyond disclosure to protect 
investors accessing investments through such ‘EU labelled’ crowdfunding platforms.229  
There may, however, be prejudicial effects, albeit at the fringes, from the deregulatory 
aspects of the CMU agenda, which sit uneasily with the current concern of EU retail market 
governance to shape the retail investment environment. The 2017 Prospectus Regulation, a key 
component of CMU’s funding-related reforms, has deregulated, at least to some extent, the 
disclosure which small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are required to file, and so may 
increase risks to the retail market, albeit that EU retail investors do not invest directly in equities to a 
significant extent. To take another example, the Commission’s CMU-related FinTech Action Plan, 
which is in part directed to fostering consumer access to financial services,230 while clearly sensitive 
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to retail market risks,231 may lead to the construction of an overly facilitative specialist regime for 
fintech financial services providers.232 The Commission has also raised the prospect of an EU-level 
‘sandbox’ for fintech firms,233 notwithstanding the unease in some supervisory quarters relating to 
sandboxes. But there is also evidence that the ESAs, now embedded within EU retail market 
governance, are bringing a countering empirical capacity, as well as challenge and friction, to the 
CMU agenda. ESMA has, for example, been cautious in relation to the fintech agenda, developing a 
data-set on developments;234 warning of the risks of crowdfunding, collecting data on national 
approaches, and calling for an EU-level approach;235 adopting warnings on certain fintech 
practices;236 and, more generally, identifying the retail markets risks from fintech and calling for a 
measured approach.237  
But while it is not proving to be destabilizing, the CMU agenda offers little in terms of 
addressing one of the most material design risks in the current retail market governance regime – 
the failure to establish metrics against which its success can be measured. Nonetheless, there are 
some welcome data-related elements. The development of the CMU agenda has strengthened the 
Commission’s data-set on the EU retail market.238 Further, the two major CMU-driven reviews 
currently underway (into retail market distribution systems; and into the performance of long-term 
investment products) should generate a badly-needed and overdue data-set on structural 
weaknesses in the EU retail market. Both may also lead to a more empirically-informed and 
outcome-based approach to the retail markets. The CMU agenda is in addition reinforcing the role of 
the ESAs, both formally, by linking the adoption of the 2017 ESA Reform Proposal to the CMU 
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agenda,239 and informally, by creating opportunities for the ESAs to strengthen their position as 
regards retail market governance. In their responses to the 2017 CMU Green Paper on Retail 
Financial Services, for example, EBA and ESMA took the opportunity to identify weaknesses in their 
retail mandates, notably in relation to inconsistencies in the legislation which supports EU retail 
market governance.240 ESMA has also used the CMU agenda to strengthen its position as a major 
advocate for retail investor interests in the EU, warning that while the CMU agenda should be used 
to increase retail participation, an enhanced level of protection was necessary.241 Overall, however, 
CMU is unlikely to have major consequences for the current design of EU retail market governance. 
The 2017 ESA Reform Proposal 
Since their establishment in 2011, the ESAs, while not dedicated retail market authorities, have 
come to provide something of an institutional buttress for securing the promotion of retail investor 
interests in the EU. This is particularly the case with ESMA which, through its quasi-rule-making, 
supervisory convergence, data collection, and direct product intervention powers, is proving to be 
an increasingly assertive supporter of retail investor interests. Over time, a gradual intensification of 
its retail market activities could have been expected, particularly given ESMA’s institutional 
incentives for prioritizing retail matters; the European Parliament, a key institutional stakeholder for 
ESMA, has long been supportive of greater EU-level support for retail investors.  The 2017 ESA 
Reform Proposal, however, has intervened and may lead to a change in ESMA’s posture. 
The Proposal, if adopted (and this is far from certain), does not contain much in the way of 
specific retail market powers for ESMA, reflecting the local nature of retail market risks and 
supervision, and NCAs’ concern to retain supervisory autonomy in this area.  Earlier, the 2017 ESA 
Consultation had exposed the different interests which institutional reform in relation to retail 
market governance generates. While there was retail investor/consumer stakeholder support for a 
stronger ESMA retail investor protection mandate, and concern as to a perceived lack of ESMA 
action in this area, public authorities/NCAs and the industry did not support any extension of the 
ESAs’/ESMA’s powers in this area, although there was some support for the ESAs/ESMA taking a 
more proactive role in financial literacy and in relation to financial innovation. The Commission, 
while supportive of strengthening the ESAs’ role in financial consumer protection, was cautious, 
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careful to note that consumer protection was a shared competence between the EU and its Member 
States.242  
The 2017 ESA Proposal reflects this wary approach. If adopted it would add ‘consumer 
protection’ to the list of tasks set out for ESMA in Article 8 of its founding Regulation; while a largely 
semantic reform (ESMA is already charged with the task of fostering investor protection under 
Article 8 and has consumer protection as a general objective under Article 1(5)),243  it would 
underline the importance of the retail investor interest. The Proposal also suggests a strengthening 
of ESMA’s Article 9 investor-protection-oriented list of specific tasks.244 If adopted, this reform would 
require ESMA, under Article 9, to engage in thematic reviews of market conduct, and to build a 
common understanding of market practices and to develop retail risk indicators for the timely 
identification of potential causes of consumer and investor harm. The Proposal further suggests a 
useful governance reform which reflects the reality that not all NCAs have express consumer 
protection mandates, making retail-oriented action more difficult: authorities responsible for 
consumer protection would be represented on ESMA’s Financial Innovation Standing Committee, 
and the Board of Supervisors’ composition rules would be required to allow an NCA, where it did not 
have responsibility for the enforcement of consumer protection rules, to invite a (non-voting) 
representative of the relevant national consumer protection authority. Retail/consumer 
stakeholders have been hostile to the limited set of reforms, suggesting, in a joint submission, that 
the Commission had missed an ‘historic opportunity’ to propose an ambitious reform, warning that 
the ESAs were insufficiently focused on consumer protection and highlighting the persistence of mis-
selling, underlining the risks arising from the sectoral/silo-based nature of the three ESAs, and calling 
for the establishment of a dedicated, specialist EU Financial  Consumer Protection Agency.245  
The retail-oriented proposed reforms to ESMA are certainly limited and are unlikely of 
themselves to lead to a change in ESMA’s current posture as regards the retail markets. The 
Proposal’s other reforms, however, may, if adopted, prove to be a distraction that diverts ESMA 
from retail market concerns.  If adopted, the Proposal would confer on ESMA a series of new direct 
supervisory powers which are almost entirely concerned with the professional markets;246 while 
these powers are limited, they may lead to ESMA’s institutional culture and attention being diverted 
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away from the retail markets (ESMA may also, under related reforms, be conferred with direct 
supervisory powers over Central Clearing Counterparties (CCPs), market infrastructures of immense 
systemic significance, that could have a similar effect). ESMA’s ability to proceed against NCAs and to 
undertake peer reviews would also be strengthened if the Proposal was adopted (by means of the 
removal of certain decision-making powers from the ESMA Board of Supervisors to a new 
bureaucratic Executive Board). This could inject a degree of distrust and antagonism into the pivotal 
NCA/ESMA relationship and make it more difficult for ESMA to drive good retail market supervisory 
practices.  
The most likely outcome, given the degree of contestation the Proposal is provoking and 
Member States’ sensitivity to any EU-level centralisation of supervisory power over financial 
markets,247 is that ESMA will emerge as somewhat but not radically strengthened, and will continue 
to have incentives to focus on the retail markets. This modest outcome has attractions given that 
retail investment remains a local activity and there are dangers to standardization of rules and, in 
particular, of supervisory practices.   
Brexit 
Finally, the implications of Brexit fall to be considered, and here a prediction of limited change can 
be made relatively confidently even though the nature of the UK/EU financial services relationship 
after the UK withdrawal remains unclear. 248 
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In terms of market effects, while any serious rupture in the pipeline of financial services 
from the UK to the EU-27 could have destabilizing effects,249 these are likely to be limited to the 
wholesale markets, as retail markets are organised on national lines and are not cross-border in 
nature. This is not to say that households may not be affected; a major dislocation in the EU financial 
market following from an abrupt rupture between the UK and the EU would not leave retail 
investors unscathed, but the direct consequences are likely to be limited.  Certain consumer finance 
products, notably insurance contracts, may be at risk as UK providers will need to be re-authorised in 
an EU Member State in order to continue to meet their contractual obligations to service 
contracts,250 but contract continuity risks of this type are less acute in the retail investment market.  
Brexit is also unlikely to bring disruptive change to how EU retail market governance is 
designed. The UK has had a major influence on the design of retail market regulation as one of EU’s 
path-finding innovators in this area,251 but the retail market rulebook is now extensive, while major 
retail market regulators, such as the Dutch AFM, are likely to continue to shape how the rulebook is 
designed.  
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The inflection point that can be identified in EU financial market governance at present is not likely 
to have a major influence on EU retail market governance, which has, since the financial crisis 
period, become more interventionist, procedural, prudential, and technocratic. While this change to 
the design of EU retail market governance is not without risks, it marks a new approach which 
augurs well for the retail market. This new approach is primarily directed to reshaping the processes 
through which firms engage with the retail market and to minimizing the risks to retail investors. 
This predominantly protective and distrustful approach should bring also encouragement, and 
related participation, benefits if it succeeds in creating a ‘safer space’ for retail investors.   
There are, of course, gaps. EU retail market governance is not a complete system, being 
based primarily based on ex-ante regulatory and supervisory measures. Ex-post enforcement, both 
public and private, remains a national competence and thus dependent on national procedural and 
institutional contexts, while the relationship between private parties’ enforcement rights (including 
contractual rights) and public enforcement of the EU’s rulebook, is still being worked out.  252 
Further, a more radical approach to ex-ante retail market governance could be imagined, 
based on providing regulatory and supervisory incentives for new, low-cost distribution systems and 
for ‘safe’, ‘simple’ investment products. MiFID II has made significant progress in relation to the 
management of conflicts of interests in the distribution process, but it is not designed to support 
access to simple, low-cost advice services; such services may instead become a casualty of the costs 
associated with the MiFID II reforms. The lack of low-cost advice channels for supporting retail 
investors with the most basic of investment needs has, however, been repeatedly identified as an 
obstruction to EU retail market participation.253 The CMU commitment to reviewing the nature of 
the EU distribution market is welcome. But it is not easy to dictate by regulatory/supervisory fiat the 
availability of low-cost advice channels.254  Ultimately, the development of such channels will 
depend on whether a business case can be found by the industry; fintech and its support of 
automated advice delivery may hold the most promise in this regard. The role of EU retail market 
governance, and in particular of the ESAs, should be supportive here, directed to: ensuring that the 
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relevant EU rules, including the new MiFID II product governance rules on distribution, are applied 
and supervised in a manner that encourages new industry thinking; and collating and 
communicating national experiences with the support of low-cost advice channels.  Similar 
observations can be made in relation to the potential development of ‘simple’ investment products. 
The siren calls for ‘simple’ products have been getting louder in the EU. The European Parliament 
has called for ‘simple, safe, and standardised products’ and supported a ‘broader offer of 
standardised retail investment products’,255 while the CMU policy trail includes references to 
‘suitable’ products. The Commission’s June 2017 proposal for the ‘PEPP’ pension product may herald 
further product-design-related reforms. But regulatory engineering here is fraught with danger. 
Metrics are difficult to establish – for example, ‘simple’ is not a proxy for good investor outcomes; 
the complexity of a product may well be linked to stronger diversification and risk management. 
Products which are designed to be low cost can struggle to gain industry traction, particularly if 
distribution and related mis-selling risks are high. Regulatory labels for ‘simple’ products can lead to 
moral hazard risks. The new MiFID II product governance rules, however, hold great promise as a 
means for focusing firms’ attention on the product design and targeting process; their appropriate 
supervision and enforcement is likely to prove more fruitful in terms of products being more closely 
related to investor needs than new adventures in regulatory design.    
The conclusion of this analysis of EU retail market governance after a period of intense 
reform is accordingly positive.  The recent reform period has seen the emergence of regulatory, 
supervisory, and institutional arrangements that have the potential to drive stronger retail investor 
outcomes and that should not be weakened by the current inflection point. The absence of 
outcomes and metrics against which the success of the new regime can be assessed remains a 
difficulty, but the current developmental trajectory suggest that the EU’s retail market regime is 
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